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Heightened Shareholder Interest in Firm Affairs following the Inception of Credit Default 
Swap Trade 
 
ABSTRACT: The literature shows that a lender reduces its monitoring of client activities and 
decreases the accommodation it offers to a distressed client after the lender receives insurance on 
its outstanding client debt via a credit default swap (CDS). These changes in lender behavior can 
exacerbate downside risk but can also create upside potential for the reference firm’s shareholders.  
We predict that the firm’s shareholders, being the residual claimholders, would then increase their 
interest in firm affairs, by demanding improved corporate governance and the quality of financial 
reports. We find an increase in independence of the board of directors and a decline in the dual 
position of chief executive officer and board chairman following the onset of CDS trading. We 
also find higher earnings response coefficient and trading volumes around the earnings 
announcement dates and lower post–earnings announcement drift. Overall, our results suggest that 
shareholders demand and obtain higher quality of, or pay greater attention to, financial reports in 
the years following the onset of CDS trading.   
 JEL Classifications: G32, G33; M41; M48  
Keywords: Credit default swap; Agency conflict; Corporate governance; Financial reporting 
quality; bankruptcy 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Prior studies show that the onset of trading of credit default swap (CDS) on a reference 
firm’s outstanding loan, an event beyond the firm’s shareholder control, can significantly increase 
the down side risk as well as the upside potential for the firm’s shareholders.1 We hypothesize that 
the outside shareholders would respond to CDS inception by taking two actions.2 First, they would 
demand stronger corporate governance. Second, they would pay greater attention to the firm’s 
financial performance and seek improved quality of financial reports. We find strong evidence 
supporting these two hypotheses. We contribute to the literature by showing enhanced shareholder 
interest in firm affairs and a shift in control rights from managers and lenders toward shareholders 
in the years following the CDS inception (Aghion and Bolton 1992; Kim, Shroff, Vyas, 
Wittengerg-Moerman 2017).  
The onset of CDS trading could be harmful to the reference firm’s shareholders in two 
ways. First, the lender, having purchased insurance on its credit risk, retains the legal rights 
attached to the lending arrangement, but loses interest in the efficient continuation of the borrower 
as much as before (Hu and Black, 2008; Bolton and Oehmke, 2011). In particular, the “empty” 
lender does not derive the same benefit from renegotiating with the borrower, and accommodating 
the needs of a distressed borrowers, by giving additional loans for example, as much as before 
(Morrison 2005; Arentsen, Mauer, Rosenlund, Zhang, and Zhao 2015; Martin and Roychowdhuy 
2015). At an extreme, a CDS-holding lender might strategically encourage the distressed borrower 
to default on its loan obligations, in order to receive a more handsome insurance payment now 
                                                             
1  For example, Hu and Black (2008), Bolton and Oehmke (2011), Subrahmanyam, Tang, and Wang (2014), and Danis 
(2016). 
2  For example, Berle and Means (1933); Jensen and Meckling (1976), Watts and Zimmerman (1978, 1983), and Ball 
(2001). 
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rather than wait for the distressed borrower to recover and meet its loan obligations (Pollack 2013). 
Such an increase in lender intransigence post CDS inception violates the trust based on which the 
borrower initially entered into the debt contracts, particularly, the anticipation of future 
accommodation and renegotiation, as is evident from 90% of corporate long-term loans being 
renegotiated before maturity (Roberts and Sufi 2009). The altered lender behavior can cause 
inefficient bankruptcy or termination of the borrowing firm even when the borrower can meet the 
lender dues with high probability after riding over its temporary liquidity problems 
(Subrahmanyam et al. 2014). The suboptimal discontinuation of the borrower can jeopardize 
shareholder value.3 
Furthermore, after having hedged its risk post–CDS inception, the lender would likely 
reduce its costly monitoring efforts and impose lesser discipline upon the borrower in the event of 
a covenant violation (Chakraborty, Chava, and Ganduri 2015).4 The weakened lender monitoring 
and oversight might increase managerial opportunism (Diamond 1984; Besanko and Kanatas 
1993; Ahn and Choi 2009; Kim and Zhang 2016). For example, managers might began 
implementing the second-best projects, from which they can derive private benefits of control, 
instead of the first-best projects that create firm value (Morrison 2005). Another concern is that, 
managers can start trading on their private information in CDS markets without having to disclose 
all their trades, because the insider trading in CDS markets is not regulated unlike other securities 
markets (Batta et al. 2016). Thus, managers can pursue their private interests to a greater extent 
                                                             
3 For example, the suboptimal discontinuation of the borrower can endanger the time value of shareholders’ call option, 
which is increasing with the time remaining to the option exercise date or expiration date. The time value of the call 
option arises from the possibility that the company can turn around and create value for residual claim holders. 
4 In addition, the lender’s asset is now assigned the risk of the CDS guarantor instead of that of the borrower (Basel 
II, page 49, Article 141). The resultant change of the counterparty risk from borrower to CDS writer reduces the 
lender’s regulatory capital requirement, allowing it to expand its loan portfolio (Shan, Tang, and Yan 2014). Such a 
portfolio expansion further dilutes the lender’s monitoring effort per client.  
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after CDS trading than before, at the expense of outside shareholders. Both increased lender 
intransigence and lowered lender monitoring, following the CDS inception, can therefore harm 
shareholder interests. 
On the flip side of the same coin, the weakened monitoring by lenders can benefit 
shareholders if the borrowing firm can take actions that improve shareholder wealth, which were 
previously constrained by lender monitoring (Chang et al. 2017; Campello and Matta 2012; 
Acharya and Ryan, 2016; Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Given their limited liability and infinite 
upside potential, shareholders’ equity is synonymous with a call option with face-value of debt as 
the strike price. The value of this option increases with asset volatility. The same volatility 
increases the downside risks for the firm’s lenders, because lenders bear all losses from decline in 
firm value below the face value of the debt but get no upside. Lenders therefore actively monitor 
clients to prevent asset substitution and undertaking of risky projects. The reduced lender 
monitoring post CDS inception can, therefore, permit the borrowers to implement risky projects, 
thus transferring wealth from lenders to shareholders.  
To sum up the above discussion, the onset of CDS trading increases both the downside 
investment risk and the upside potential for the outside shareholders. We argue that shareholders, 
being the residual claimholders, must enhance their interest in firm affairs post–CDS inception to 
protect their interests (e.g., Kim et al. 2017). We test this hypothesis by examining two principal 
avenues available to outside shareholders: (1) demanding improved corporate governance and (2) 
paying greater attention to, and insisting on improved quality of, financial reporting.  
We first examine changes in the structure of the board of directors following the CDS 
inception. Thousands of dispersed shareholders are unable to control or monitor corporate business 
decisions (Bainbridge 2006). Shareholders collectively appoint directors to the board and empower 
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them to make decisions on their behalf with respect to the corporation’s significant actions and 
transactions (Berle and Means 1932). Independent directors are more likely to protect shareholder 
interests than are directors who are managers of the company as is evident from the fact that 
independent directors are often appointed in response to crisis situations (Gordon 2007).5 Thus, 
we hypothesize that shareholders would demand an increase in board independence post–CDS 
inception. The effectiveness of board independence, however, is compromised when the chief 
executive officer (CEO) also holds the position of board chairman (Jensen 1993; Goyal and Park 
2002). Hence, we expect that shareholders would demand a reduction in CEO–chairman duality 
post–CDS inception. We find results consistent with our expectations, that is, an improvement in 
board independence and decline in CEO–chairman duality in years following the onset of CDS 
trading. 
Second, we hypothesize that post–CDS inception, outside investors would demand higher 
quality financial reports (those that more accurately reflect the underlying firm performance in the 
current period) and that they would pay greater attention to financial reports. We complement prior 
literature which shows that managers’ earnings guidance and analyst earnings forecasts become 
more informative after CDS inception, arguably because managers respond to shareholder 
demands for improved voluntary disclosures (Kim et al. 2017; Batta et al. 2016). Despite the 
existence of equity analysts’ reports and managers’ voluntary earnings guidance, SEC-mandated 
financial reports remain an important source of value-relevant information for outside investors 
(Beyer et al. 2010). Accordingly, we expect post–CDS inception improvement in financial 
reporting quality, particularly for firms that do not provide earnings guidance. 
                                                             
5 See, for example, Weisbach (1988), Core, Holthausen, and Larcker (1999), Chhaochharia and Grinstein (2009), 
Beasley (1996), Dechow, Sloan, and Sweeney (1996), Beasley, Carcello, Hermanson, and Lapides (2000), and 
Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell (2008). 
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We test our hypothesis by examining post–CDS changes in measures of financial reporting 
quality and shareholder attention to financial reports. We find increases in earnings response 
coefficient (Ball and Brown 1967; Holthausen and Verrecchia 1988; Liu and Thomas 2000) and 
trading volume on earnings announcement dates (Beaver 1968). We also observe a decline in post–
earnings announcement drift (PEAD), which suggests that equity investors underreact less to 
value-relevant information contained in earnings on earnings announcement dates (e.g., 
Hirshleifer, Lim, and Teoh 2009). In addition, the estimation errors of working capital accruals 
decline (Dechow and Dichev 2002). These developments show heightened shareholder attention 
to, or improved quality of, earnings reports in the years following CDS inception. Our results are 
stronger or hold only for firms that do not provide earnings guidance, and therefore, cannot 
improve management guidance post CDS inception. In this respect, we extend Kim et al. (2017), 
who document an increase in frequency of firm voluntary disclosure following CDS trading. We 
demonstrate that the mandated financial reports and shareholder control mechanisms improve 
subsequent to the CDS inception, when value-relevant information is not more forthcoming from 
the managers on a voluntary basis.  
We conduct five cross-sectional tests to strengthen our identification strategy and to gain 
further insights. We expect stronger results in settings in which the lender had less effective 
monitoring power before CDS inception or more likely loses its interest post CDS inception. First, 
we isolate banks that likely hedged their exposure upon CDS inception (Minton, Stulz, and 
Williamson 2009; Subrahmanyam et al. 2014).6 Our results are stronger for the subsample of 
borrowers associated with those lenders. Second, we find stronger results for syndicated loans than 
                                                             
6 Lending banks can increase their risky assets after hedging their existing credit risks via CDS contracts (Martin and 
Roychowdhury 2015). Thus, banks that increased their risk-weighted assets in the year of their client’s CDS initiation, 
likely hedged their credit risks. 
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for solo lenders. Syndicated loans face greater coordination issues and agency problems among 
the consortium members, compared to solo lenders, and both problems are likely to worsen after 
one or more consortium lenders hedge their client risks via a CDS (Preecea and Mullineaux 1996; 
Ivashina 2009; Amiram, Beaver, Landsman, and Zhao, 2017). Third, our documented results are 
stronger when loans carry fewer financial covenants, the main device for lender monitoring 
(Dichev and Skinner 2002; Kim et al. 2017). Fourth, we find stronger effects when the borrower 
displays greater financial distress pre-CDS. Lenders to borrowers with greater ex-ante likelihood 
of financial failure suffer lower reputational damage upon the borrower failure, because lower 
lender monitoring cannot be pinpointed as the principal reason for the ex-post borrower bankruptcy 
(Gopalan, Nanda, and Yerramilli 2011; Kim et al. 2017).7 These cross-sectional results support 
our conclusion that the heightened shareholder interest post CDS inception is related to reduced 
monitoring efforts and increased intransigence by lender banks. Fifth, we find at least some 
evidence that borrowers with dedicated institutional investors, those who can demand and obtain 
larger changes in governance and financial reporting quality, witness larger changes in governance 
and financial reporting quality than do borrowers with transient shareholders.  
Overall, our results indicate that the financial reporting quality improves post–CDS 
inception. Some may argue that our findings run contrary to Martin and Roychowdhuy (2015), 
who show a post–CDS inception decline in accounting conservatism, which is another measure of 
financial reporting quality. This apparent contradiction can be resolved by the prior studies’ 
argument that there does not exist a single, universal measure of financial statement quality that 
                                                             
7 Lending is a repeated game and lender’s poor monitoring that affects the borrower’s performance can affect lender’ 
reputation and track. Banks, trading monitoring costs against reputational costs, would reduce the monitoring of their 
CDS-traded borrowers, only when the reputational fallouts are lower than reduction in monitoring costs (Ashcraft and 
Santos 2009; Parlour and Winton 2013; Martin and Roychowdhury 2015). 
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befits all decision contexts of all financial statement users (Ball 2001; Holthausen and Watts 2001; 
Dechow, Ge, and Schrand 2010). All else equal, lenders prioritize conservatism to relevance, 
because they face large downside risk but have limited upside potential (Watts 2003). By receiving 
bad news in a timelier manner than good news, conservatism helps lenders to enforce debt 
covenants and promptly arrest further decline in values of securitized assets after a bad event 
occurs (LaFond and Watts 2008). In contrast, shareholders, given their limited liability and infinite 
upside potential, prioritize relevance, that is, timely provision of both good and bad news in 
financial reports (Barth, Beaver, and Landsman 2001, Lambert 2010). For example, equity 
investors demand timely recording of revenues and assets that signal improvement in future cash 
flows, even when their recording violates the tenet of conservative accounting (Guay and 
Verreccchia 2006). So, our apparently contradictory results, on shifts in attributes of financial 
reporting from conservatism towards value relevance, can be justified by the post–CDS inception 
heightening and diminishment of interests in firm affairs by shareholders and lenders, respectively.  
Even though a third party initiates the CDS trading, the timing of the inception of CDS 
trading may not be a random event and could be associated with simultaneous changes in corporate 
governance and earnings quality. We address the potential endogeneity problems related to CDS 
inception, particularly omitted factors that determine the demand for and supply of CDS contracts 
(Ashcraft and Santos 2009), by conducting all our tests using a difference-in-differences approach 
relative to non-CDS firms. [Subrahmanyam et al. (2014), Martin and Roychowdhury (2015), Batta 
et al. (2016), and Kim et al. (2017) use a similar approach.] In addition, we use a Heckman two-
stage procedure to control for selection bias (Martin and Roychowdhury 2015).  
Our paper contributes to two streams of literature. The first examines a range of economic 
consequences of CDS inception, including improved analyst earnings forecasts (Batta et al. 2016), 
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higher bankruptcy risk (Subrahmanyam et al. 2014), more conservative cash holding policies 
(Subrahmanyam, Tang, and Wang 2017), less conservative financial reporting (Martin and 
Roychowdhury 2015), and enhanced managerial disclosures (Kim et al. 2017).  We add to this 
literature by showing changes in the structure of boards of directors, the quality of financial reports, 
and equity shareholders’ interest in financial reports post–CDS inception. Our results support the 
premise in Kim et al. (2017) that shareholders step up their monitoring of firm affairs after the start 
of CDS trades. Our findings are consistent with the reallocation of control rights from lenders 
toward shareholders post–CDS inception (Aghion and Bolton 1992).  
The second stream of literature, we contribute to, examines the changes in properties of 
financial reports after a given event. We identify a unique event that contrastingly affects the 
proxies for earnings quality. These proxies change in a direction consistent with the opposing shifts 
in two principal stakeholders’ interests—improvement in relevance from the equity investors’ 
enhanced interests, but decline in conservatism from the lenders’ reduced interests (Martin and 
Rowchowdhury 2015). We support the assertion in Dechow et al. (2010) that all proxies for 
earnings quality need not be in sync with each other and that they could even move in opposite 
directions depending on the shifts in demands of different stakeholders. 
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section II reviews prior literature and develops 
the main hypotheses. Section III discusses the research design, sample selection, and measurement 
of variables. Section IV presents the empirical results. Section V describes robustness tests, and 
Section VI concludes the paper. 
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II.  LITERATURE REVIEW AND MOTIVATION OF HYPOTHESES 
 In this section, we review prior literature and formulate hypotheses. 
Prior Literature 
CDSs were initially created to hedge the credit risk of bank loans. After the International 
Swaps and Derivatives Association (ISDA) standardized CDS contracts, new CDS writers with no 
direct association with the underlying firm, such as hedge funds and asset managers, entered the 
CDS market. The notional amount of outstanding CDS contracts peaked at $62.2 trillion by the 
end of 2007. After the financial crisis of 2008–2009, the notional amount declined, but it remains 
at the double-digit trillion-dollar level.  
A CDS buyer purchases insurance against a credit event of an underlying reference entity 
by paying an annuity premium to the protection seller (Augustin et al. 2014). A credit event is an 
occurrence that adversely affects the reference entity’s creditworthiness, such as a default of 
interest or principal payment or a violation of a covenant of a junior or senior debt. The initiation 
of CDS trades thus offers the lender an opportunity to change its counterparty risk to the one based 
on a more creditworthy CDS writer, even if the CDS is not written on the lender’s original asset. 
The lender, being the legal claimant to the original debt, continues to hold the rights associated 
with the lending contract despite having purchased the credit risk protection and having reduced 
its economic interest in the borrower (Hu and Black 2008; Bolton and Oehmke, 2011). This post–
CDS trade phenomenon is referred to in prior literature as the separation of control rights and cash 
flow rights. 
Borrowers enter into lending arrangements with an understanding that the lender would 
renegotiate the contract in the future if adverse changes in the firm’s environment occur (Roberts 
and Sufi 2009; Denis and Wang 2014). The lender’s interest in the efficient continuation of the 
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debtor, however, declines after having obtained insurance (Bolton and Oehmke 2011). The lender 
becomes less flexible in negotiating with the client upon any credit event and is less willing to 
provide additional loans to the borrower to ride out its temporary liquidity problems. It could even 
push the borrower into a credit default, inefficient bankruptcy, or liquidation to collect a more 
handsome insurance payment.8 The increased lender intransigence post–CDS inception thus 
enhances the likelihood of the reference entity’s bankruptcy, even though the reference entity plays 
no role in the creation of CDSs or the inception of their trades (Subrahmanyam et al. 2014). Stated 
differently, CDS inception is an event over which the shareholders of the reference entity have 
little control, but it increases the likelihood of sudden decline in share price and loss of shareholder 
wealth, all else held equal. 
Lenders actively monitor client activities to ensure the security of their assets. Furthermore, 
lenders enforce their rights in the event of debt covenant violations. Monitoring and contract 
enforcement, however, are costly. An empty lender is less likely to monitor clients’ activities and 
enforce contractual provisions as much as before (Morrison 2005; Ashcraft and Santos 2009; 
Subrahmanyam et al. 2014). In addition, its monitoring efforts would be spread over a larger 
number of clients, because its regulatory capital requirement are reduced on account of improved 
counterparty risk, allowing it to expansion its loan portfolio (Shan et al. 2014). Such reduced lender 
monitoring and laxer enforcement of lender covenants could harm shareholder interest because 
lender monitoring improves managerial commitment and reduces managerial opportunism.9 
                                                             
8 See https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2017-11-17/blackstone-may-do-its-cleverest-cds-trade-again (last 
access Dec 22, 2017). Blackstone Group LP’s GSO Capital Partners credit fund, which owned a CDS on distressed 
Spanish gaming company Codere SA, forced Codere to miss an interest payment on its bonds to trigger default. 
9 Bank monitoring is useful for other lenders and shareholders because closely monitored loans signal a borrowing 
firm’s creditworthiness and lowers the information costs of other agents in the firm (Diamond 1984; Fama 1985; Sufi 
2007). 
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In certain circumstances, lesser lender monitoring could benefit shareholders who own a 
European call option on the firm’s assets, with the face value of debt being the strike price.10 
Shareholders thus have a strong incentive to increase asset volatility. However, the same increase 
in asset volatility increases the downside risk for lenders. Reduced oversight from lenders 
following CDS inception could permit the client firm to change its real activities in ways that 
benefit company shareholders, but were previously constrained by lenders (Campello and Matta 
2012). To the extent that rival lender and shareholder forces determine the corporate investment 
policy, that equilibrium would shift toward shareholder interests once the lender loses its interests 
in monitoring client activities (Jensen and Mecking 1976).  
Thus, on one hand, CDS inception could cause a sudden loss of shareholder wealth with 
firm bankruptcy. On the other hand, CDS inception can increase upside potential for firm 
shareholders via changes in the firm’s investment policy. Furthermore, insiders can trade on their 
private information in CDS markets without having to disclose all of their trades (Batta et al. 2016). 
In any of these cases, external investors would be better protect the value of their investments by 
taking greater interest in the firm affairs post–CDS inception and enforcing their control and 
monitoring rights (Kim et al. 2017). We examine two avenues to achieve this purpose: corporate 
governance and financial reporting. 
Corporate Governance 
 The board of directors plays the single most important role in the corporate-governance 
system. The thousands of dispersed shareholders of the modern publicly traded corporation are 
unable to come together to dictate business decisions. Therefore, they elect a centralized group—
                                                             
10 They get to keep an increase in firm value beyond the face value of debt, but they do not have to compensate lenders 
when the firm value declines below the face value of debt. 
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the board of directors—to represent their interests (Berle and Means 1932). Under the corporate 
laws of most states, the board is entrusted with the management of the business and affairs of the 
corporation (Mourning 2007). State laws typically provide the board with the final legal say on 
most of the corporation’s significant decisions and transactions. Ideally, directors, acting as a 
board, must keep the interests of the shareholders foremost in their collective mind.  
Given that directors work based on their own personal incentives and reputational concerns 
(Masulis and Mobbs 2013), shareholders are allowed to elect those who have their trust and 
confidence and vote out those who are not responsive to their concerns and requests (DeGaetano 
2004). Prior studies show that independent directors better protect shareholder interests than 
executive directors, on average. Director independence is associated with an increase in turnover 
of poorly performing CEOs (e.g., Weisbach 1988), more efficient executive compensation 
decisions (e.g., Core et al. 1999; Chhaochharia and Grinstein 2009), a decrease in the incidence of 
fraud (e.g., Beasley 1996; Dechow et al. 1996; Beasley et al. 2000), and a decrease in the 
opportunistic timing of stock option grants (e.g., Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell 2008). Hence, 
shareholders respond to adverse events by appointing more independent directors to the board 
(Gordon 2007). Based on the idea that shareholders would take greater interest in firm affairs post–
CDS inception, we hypothesize that the percentage of independent directors on the board of a 
company would increase after the onset of CDS trading. Independent directors’ efforts to protect 
shareholder rights are, however, hindered by a CEO who also holds the position of chairman of 
the board. Therefore, we also expect a reduction in the frequency of CEO–chairman duality post–
CDS inception.  
Theoretical support for our hypothesis comes from the notion that board structure is 
determined by the demands of firm stakeholders (Hermalin and Weisbach 1988, 1998, 2003). 
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Nevertheless, Kroszner and Strahan (2001) and Güner, Malmendier, and Tate (2008) find evidence 
of conflicts of interest between board directors appointed by creditors and shareholders. For 
example, Ferreira, Ferreira, and Mariano (2017) find an increase in bankers’ representation on 
corporate boards following the violations in loan covenants. Given that CDS initiation could be 
followed by reduced lender interest in monitoring the company, but heightened shareholder 
interest (Kim et al. 2017), we expect the opposite of trends documented in Ferreira et al.  (2017), 
that is, a shift in board of directors towards shareholder interest, all else held equal. 
However, prior research indicates several other economic reasons that could potentially 
predict null results on earnings quality and corporate governance after CDS trade initiation. First, 
the sellers of CDS contracts may anticipate the negative externalities of CDS initiation on a 
borrower and price them into the CDS premium. In principle, CDS sellers, many of which are 
large financial institutions, can price-protect themselves by increasing a premium if they can infer 
reduced lender monitoring by observing bankruptcies of borrowers following the onset of CDS 
trading. To lower protection prices or avoid the reputation costs arising from adverse credit events 
due to reduced monitoring, CDS-insured lenders may continue to intensively monitor borrowers 
in the post–CDS period, thereby reducing the necessity for shareholders to step up their monitoring 
through stronger governance or higher quality reporting. Moreover, the costs of demanding 
stronger governance and higher reporting reporting may be costly to shareholders and might not 
be achievable at all, given dispersed ownership. Additionally, CDS contracts are still largely traded 
in the informationally opaque over-the-counter markets (Qiu and Yu 2012). Thus, shareholders 
might not learn about the initiation of CDS trading. Thus, it remains an empirical question whether 
CDS trading is associated with any change in governance as well as financial reporting quality. 
We examine this question in H1in a null hypothesis. 
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H1: Board independence and CEO–chairman duality do not change following the onset of 
CDS trading. 
Financial reporting quality 
External shareholders should pay greater attention to firm affairs post–CDS inception. 
Consistent with this idea, Kim et al. (2017) find that shareholders seek, and managers provide, 
more frequent voluntary earnings guidance. Despite the existence of managers’ voluntary 
disclosures and analysts’ forecasts, SEC-mandated financial reports remain a principal source of 
value-relevant information for investors (Beyer et al. 2010). Financial statement information is 
also used for managerial contracting and stewardship.. We therefore hypothesize that outside 
investors would demand improvement in financial reporting quality and would pay greater 
attention to firms’ financial reports post–CDS inception.  
H2: Investor attention to financial reports increases, and the proxies for decision 
usefulness of earnings improve, following the onset of CDS trading. 
We test our hypothesis by examining changes in earnings response coefficient (Ball and 
Brown 1967; Holthausen and Verrecchia 1988; Liu and Thomas 2000), trading volume on earnings 
announcement dates (Beaver 1968), and PEAD (Hirshleifer et al. 2009). In addition, we examine 
estimation errors in working capital accruals (Dechow and Dichev 2002). Thus, the empirical 
proxies we examine are also considered the measures of financial reporting quality. Our hypothesis 
of improvement in financial reporting quality therefore seemingly contradicts prior findings of 
post–CDS inception decline in accounting conservatism, which is another proxy for financial 
reporting quality (Martin and Roychowdhury 2015). This apparent contradiction is supported in 
prior literature which highlights the multiple facets and uses of financial reports to different 
stakeholders. 
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Financial statements support a wide range of decisions for different stakeholders. 
Therefore, the attributes of financial reporting are shaped by the stakeholders’ demands (Ball 
2001). The relative weights of those demands, when they differ, determine the final attributes 
(Holthausen and Watts 2001). Lenders place higher weight on accounting conservatism (timelier 
recognition of losses than gains) than do shareholders, as lenders stand to lose more from a decline 
in firm value than the amount they gain from an increase in firm value (LaFond and Watts 2008). 
Conservatism, however, is just one attribute of a firm’s financial reporting system. The 
Financial Accounting Standard Board (FASB) conceptual framework stipulates that financial 
statements should help investors in ‘‘assessing the amounts, timing, and uncertainty’’ of future 
cash flows (FASB Concepts No. 1. 1978, p.3). A firm’s performance, as summarized in its income 
statement, is an important factor in investors’ assessment of current-period changes in the present 
value of future cash flows (Ou and Penman 1989). Equity investors therefore demand timely 
reporting of value-relevant information to identify profitable investment opportunities. For 
example, equity investors could demand recording of revenues and assets that signal improvement 
in future cash flows, even when their recording violates the tenet of conservative accounting. 
Furthermore, shareholders could be better off with the reporting of profits for a firm that is on the 
verge of debt default and whose dividend payouts are determined by reported profits. The same 
dividend payment would cause wealth transfer from lenders to shareholders.  
In sum, the proxies for earnings quality differ by the contexts of decisions made based on 
financial statements. They could change based on variation in demands from different stakeholders 
in response to the same event (Dechow et al. 2010). H2, therefore, also tests the proposition put 
forward by Dechow et al. (2010). 
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III. SAMPLE SELECTION AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
In this section, we describe the selection of sample and control firms and discuss their key 
statistics.  
 Sample Selection  
We collect data from the Markit database, which covers CDS quotes of U.S. firms starting 
in 2001. Markit verifies its CDS data through a multistage scrubbing procedure that includes 
assessing the legal relation between a reference entity and a reference obligation as well as 
corporate actions, CDS succession events, and credit events. We collect financial and stock price 
data from Compustat North America and the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP), 
respectively. We merge the Markit data with information from Compustat North America and 
CRSP using the ticker and by cross-validating the match between these data sets based on company 
names. We use two separate samples to examine our hypotheses. Testing H1 requires data on 
boards of directors that we obtain from Institutional Shareholder Services (formerly RiskMetrics) 
and BoardEx. We identify 520 U.S. firms (6,699 firm-years) that initiated trading on single-name 
CDS contracts and use 2,202 U.S. firms (14,708 firm-years) as non-CDS firms (control firms) 
during the sample period from 1998 to 2014. Our sample period begins in 1998 because the data 
coverage of Institutional Shareholder Services starts then. Testing H2 requires data for calculating 
proxies for earnings quality and PEAD. We need analyst forecasts from Institutional Brokers’ 
Estimate System (I/B/E/S), daily stock price and volume data from CRSP, and quarterly and 
annual financial variables from Compustat. We identify 610 U.S. firms (13,252 firm-years) that 
initiated trading on single-name CDS contracts and use 11,322 U.S. firms (94,203 firm-years) as 
non-CDS firms (control firms) during the sample period from 1983 to 2014. Sample selection is 
described in Panel A of Table 1. 
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[Insert Table 1 near here] 
Proxies for Corporate Governance  
We use two proxies for corporate governance: board independence (BD_INDEP), 
measured by the number of independent directors divided by the total number of directors (e.g., 
Guest 2008; Cornett, Marcus, and Tehranian 2008; Lobo and Zhao 2013), and Duality, an indicator 
variable that takes the value of one if the CEO is also the chairman of the board and zero otherwise 
(e.g., Boyd 1995; Cornett et al. 2008; Lobo and Zhao 2013). 
Proxies for Shareholder Attentiveness and Earnings Quality  
We use four proxies for shareholder attentiveness: (1) earnings response coefficient (ERC) 
and (2) R-squared (RSQ) from a regression of three-day size-adjusted stock returns on quarterly 
earnings announcement dates on changes in earnings, (3) abnormal trading volume on annual 
earnings announcement (ABVOL), and (4) post–earnings announcement drift (PEAD). The first 
three proxies of shareholder attentiveness are also considered in the literature as measures of 
earnings quality. We examine accrual quality (DDAQ) as another measure of earnings quality. 
Thus, we have three proxies of earnings quality and four proxies of shareholder attentiveness, with 
ERC, RSQ, and PEAD representing both constructs. 
Equity valuation uses information from income statements to forecast future revenues, 
earnings, and cash flows (Ou and Penman 1989). A long stream of literature going back to Ball 
and Brown (1967) considers the association between earnings and stock prices as a measure of 
usefulness of earnings from the equity investors’ perspective. Consistent with this idea, Liu and 
Thomas (2000) conclude that ERC is a strong proxy for earnings relevance, representing investor 
reaction to new information contained in earnings. We estimate a regression of cumulative three-
day size-adjusted stock returns on the earnings announcement date on the changes in quarterly 
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earnings. We estimate the following regression on a firm-year basis using four quarterly 
observations: 
Retiq= β1+ β2×∆Earningsi,q+ εi,                                                                                      (1) 
where Ret is the cumulative three-day size-adjusted stock returns on the quarterly earnings 
announcement date (day −1 to 1). ∆Earnings is firm i’s quarterly earnings change, scaled by total 
assets. We measure ERC by the coefficient on ΔEarnings (that is, β2). R-squared of equation (1) 
(RSQ) is the second proxy of earnings relevance. Both variables are also proxies for investors’ 
attentiveness to news in earnings.  
We consider estimation errors in working capital accruals as a converse measure of 
earnings quality (Dechow and Dichev 2002) as modified by McNichols (2002). This proxy is based 
on the reasoning that the role of accruals is to mitigate the noise in operating cash flow, which 
arises from exogenous or manipulative variation in firms’ working capital levels, and makes the 
operating cash flow less useful for predicting firm performance. Working capital accruals, which 
incorporate assets such as inventory, prepayments, and accounts receivable and liabilities such as 
unearned revenue, warranty provisions, and accounts payable, shift the recording of cash flows to 
the adjusted number of earnings making it more useful for representing the firm’s current 
performance and for predicting future cash flows. Nevertheless, the recording of accruals requires 
estimates about future cash flows, invariably leading to measurement errors. Therefore, estimating 
errors in accruals are considered an inverse measure of earnings quality (Dechow and Dichev 
2002). We define DDAQ as the standard deviation of three firm-year residuals on a rolling basis, 
ending in the measurement year, obtained from the cross-sectional estimation 
∆WCt=β0+	β1×CFOt-1+	β2×CFOt+	β3×CFOt+1+	β4×∆Salest+	β5×PPEt+	εt,      (2) 
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 All of the variables are scaled by beginning of year total assets.11 Equation (2) is estimated 
cross-sectionally for each industry with at least 20 observations in a given year based on the Fama 
and French (1997) 48 industry classification. We drop the observations for the CDSs’ initiation 
year and the next year, because their measurement includes the past three years’ values, requiring 
data from the pre–CDS inception years. We multiply DDAQ by minus one such that the value of 
DDAQ increases with earnings quality. 
We measure shareholder attentiveness by the abnormal volume of share trades on the 
earnings announcement dates (ABVOL). This measure represents the extent to which investors 
perceive earnings to contain value-relevant information, thus resolving or increasing disagreement 
among investors about firm value (Beaver 1968). At an extreme, if investors pay no attention to 
earnings announcements, then announcement dates would have no abnormal trading volume. 
Abnormal trading volume is measured by first subtracting the average of daily volume for the 60 
trading days preceding the annual announcement interval from the average of daily volume in the 
three-day period around annual earnings announcement (day −1 to 1). Then, the difference is 
scaled by the standard deviation of daily volume in the 60 trading days preceding the annual 
announcement interval (Landsman and Maydew 2002; Hope, Thomas, and Winterbotham 2009). 
Post–earnings announcement drift (PEAD) is our fourth proxy for investors’ attentiveness 
to news in earnings. The construct is measured by the positive and significant correlation between 
surprises in current quarter’s earnings and subsequent stock returns in the same direction. The 
correlation can result from neglect of value-relevant information contained in current-period 
                                                             
11 ∆WC denotes changes in working capital accounts as disclosed on the statement of cash from operations, measured 
as the increase in accounts receivable (RECT) plus the increase in inventory (INVT) plus the decrease in accounts 
payable and accrued liabilities (APALCH) plus decrease in taxes accrued (TXACH) plus the increase (decrease) in 
other assets (liabilities) (UAOLOCH), scaled by beginning total assets. CFO denotes cash from operations in year t 
(OANCF). ∆Sales is change in sales (SALE) scaled by beginning total assets (AT), and PPE is property, plant, and 
equipment (PPENT) scaled by beginning total assets. 
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earnings (Hirshleifer, Lim, and Teoh 2011), investors’ underreaction to earnings news arising from 
limited attention or other psychological biases (Bernard and Thomas 1989, 1990; Barberis, 
Shleifer, and Vishny 1998; Daniel et al. 1998), and limits to arbitrage (Shleifer and Vishny 1997). 
This neglect should decrease because of heightened investors’ interest in and attention to the firm’s 
reported performance post–CDS inception. Following prior work, we measure standardized 
unexpected earnings (SUE) by the earnings per share from the I/B/E/S Summary file minus the 
median of all analyst forecasts on the I/B/E/S Summary file: 
SUEi,q= 
Ei,q- Avg(Ei,q
* )#i,q ,  																																																																																																																													(3) 
where E is actual quarterly earnings per share before extraordinary items for firm i in quarter q, 
Avg (E*) is the median analyst forecasts of quarterly earnings per share, and $i,q  is  the price per 
share for firm i at the end of quarter t from Compustat (see, e.g., Livnat and Mendenhall 2006). 
Each observation requires at least two analyst forecasts. We categorize the sample into three 
subgroups, contingent upon the size of SUE per calendar quarter. Hedge portfolios are formed 
using tertile classifications based on the magnitude of SUE. Subsequent stock returns (POSTRET) 
are accumulated over the three months after the portfolio formation date (from +2 to +64 trading 
days following the announcement date). The hedge portfolios are formed by taking a long position 
in the top tertile firms and a short position in the bottom tertile firms. Hedged returns are calculated 
separately for CDS and non-CDS firms.  
Sample Distribution  
The samples of firms we examine differ for each hypothesis test because of variations in 
data requirements, as presented in Panel A of Table 1. For brevity, we report in Panel B the sample 
distribution by year for testing just one aspect of H2 that yields the highest number of observations 
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(that is, 12,769 for CDS firms and 91,023 for non-CDS firms). The first (last) two columns report 
the distribution for CDS firms (non-CDS firms). The number of observations monotonically 
increases over the sample period for both CDS firms and non-CDS firms. Table 2 reports the 
sample distribution by industry, which is based on the Campbell (1987) industry classifier. Our 
sample covers a range of industries, the most heavily represented being Basic industry for CDS 
firms (16.09%) and Consumer durables industry for non-CDS firms (16.01%), followed by 
Utilities industry for CDS firms (14.00%) and Real estate and finance industry for non-CDS firms 
(14.97%). 
[Insert Table 2 near here] 
Descriptive Statistics   
Table 3 reports descriptive statistics of the variables used in our main analyses. Following 
Subrahmanyam et al. (2014), we define CDS_FIRM as a dummy variable that equals one if the firm 
has a CDS contract traded during our sample period and zero otherwise. CDS_TRADE is a dummy 
variable that takes a value of one after CDS inception for CDS firms and zero otherwise. 
Effectively, it is an interaction of two dummy variables, CDS_FIRM (a variable that takes a value 
of one for CDS firms and zero otherwise) × POST_CDS (a variable that takes a value of one for 
years after CDS inception for the treatment firms and their matched control firms and zero 
otherwise). The mean of CDS_TRADE and CDS_FIRM is 0.0596 and 0.1230, respectively, 
indicating that firms with CDS contracts on their outstanding debt represent around 12 percent of our 
sample and those firms have their CDSs traded in approximately half of our study years. The mean 
value of BD_INDEP is 0.7282, indicating that three-fourths of boards of directors are independent. 
Mean Duality is 0.6381, showing that 64 percent of observations have CEOs also holding the 
position of board chairman. These descriptive statistics of corporate governance characteristics are 
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largely consistent with those reported by prior studies (e.g., Byrd and Hickman 1992; Shivdasani 1993; 
Brickley, Coles, and Terry 1994; Cotter, Shivdasani, and Zenner 1997; Gillette, Noe, and Rebello 
2003; Arthaud-Day, Certo, Dalton, and Dalton 2006).  
[Insert Table 3 near here] 
The mean of ERC and RSQ is 0.133 and 0.363, respectively. These statistics are consistent 
with those reported in the literature (e.g., Easton and Harris 1991). The mean of DDAQ is −0.1087, 
consistent with prior studies (e.g., Myers, Myers, and Omer 2003; Francis, LaFond, Olsson, and 
Schipper 2004, 2005). The mean of ABVOL is 1.0224, indicating that the volume of share trading 
jumps up dramatically on earnings announcement dates. The mean of POSTRET and earnings 
surprise (SUE) is −0.0008 and 0.0038, respectively. The negative value of POSTRET is consistent 
with those documented by earlier works (e.g., Abarbanell and Bernard 1992; Mendenhall 2004; 
Livnat and Mendenhall 2006). The positive average value of SUE indicates that firms beat analyst 
expectations, on average. We later discuss univariate statistics showing the existence of the PEAD 
phenomenon, evident from the positive and significant hedged portfolio return over three months 
formed by taking long and short positions in observations with highest and lowest SUE, respectively.  
  IV. TESTS OF HYPOTHESES 
 This section presents tests of our two hypotheses.  
Tests of H1: Changes in Corporate Governance upon CDS Inception    
H1 examines whether shareholders demand improved corporate governance after CDS 
inception. We estimate the following regression to test this hypothesis: 
BD_INDEPi,t or Dualityi,t=β0 + β1CDS_TRADEi,t + β2CDS_FIRMi + ∑βnControlsi,t+εi,t,						(4) 
where the dependent variable is BD_INDEP or Duality. The dummy variable CDS_TRADE takes 
a value of one after CDS inception for CDS firms and zero otherwise. As noted earlier, it is 
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effectively an interaction of two indicators, CDS_FIRM (a variable that takes a value of one for 
CDS firms and zero otherwise) × POST_CDS (a variable that takes a value of one for years after 
CDS inception for the treatment firms and their matched control firms and zero otherwise). We do 
not include the term POST_CDS because it is not definable for non-CDS firms.    
 Including both CDS_TRADE and CDS_FIRM provides a difference-in-differences research 
design to distinguish the effect of CDS inception relative to concurrent changes in non-CDS firms. 
Hence, the coefficient on the variable CDS_TRADE represents the marginal effect of CDS 
introduction on corporate governance after controlling for any changes in the characteristics of 
non-CDS firms at the same time. If CDS firms enhance corporate governance following the onset 
of CDS trading, relative to non-CDS firms, then β1 is expected to be significantly positive for the 
BD_INDEP regression and negative for the Duality regression. 
 We follow prior research and include several control variables that affect the costs and 
benefits of monitoring, advisory needs of the board of directors, and CEO influence (e.g., Guest 
2008): firm size (log of firm assets, LNAT), financial leverage (LEV), Tobin’s Q (TOBINQ), 
corporate research and development expenditure (RDEXP), cash balances (CASHSIZE), 
profitability (return on assets, ROA), industry concentration (Herfindahl-Hirschman Index, HHI), 
firm age (log of firm age, LNAGE), and standard deviation of monthly stock returns over the 12 
months preceding the financial year-end (STRETVOL). We include year and industry fixed effects 
in all regressions to control for year and industry idiosyncratic characteristics. Detailed variable 
definitions are provided in the Appendix.  
 Table 4 reports results of the multivariate regression analysis with respect to the effect of 
CDS trading upon corporate governance [Eq. (4)]. The first column reports results of Eq. (4) with 
BD_INDEP as the dependent variable; the second column, with Duality as the dependent variable. 
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Coefficients are estimated using standard errors that are adjusted using a two-dimensional cluster 
at the industry and year level (Peterson 2009). For BD_INDEP, the coefficient on CDS_TRADE is 
positive (0.0350) and significant (with p-value < 0.01), indicating that board independence 
increases by 3.5%, on average, in the years following the onset of CDS trading. For Duality, the 
coefficient is negative (−0.2968) and significant (with p-value < 0.05). While CEOs at firms with 
CDS trades during our sample period are more likely to also hold the position of board chairman, 
the CEO’s dual position decreases by 29.68% following the onset of CDS trading, a significant 
change in corporate governance. These results support H1, positing that corporate governance 
improves after CDS inception, and the idea that shareholders demand greater allocation of control 
rights (Aghion and Bolton 1992).  
[Insert Table 4 near here] 
The coefficients on control variables are consistent with those reported by prior studies 
(e.g., Guest 2008). The coefficients on firm size and firm age are significantly positive in both 
regressions (with p-value < 0.05), consistent with the notion that larger firms have a higher 
percentage of outside directors and CEOs are likely to be the chairman of board. ROA is 
significantly negative for the BD_INDEP regression, yet significantly positive for the Duality 
regression (with p-value < 0.05 for both regressions). These results are consistent with the view 
that well-performing CEOs are able to negotiate a dual position with a lower number of outside 
directors.  
Tests of H2: Changes in Shareholder Attention and Earnings Quality after CDS Inception    
H2 considers whether shareholders become more attentive to financial reports after CDS 
inception or demand higher quality financial reporting. We estimate the following regression to 
test this hypothesis: 
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DependentVariablei,t=β0 + β1CDS_TRADEi,t + β2CDS_FIRMi + ∑βnControlsi,t+εi,t,      (5) 
where the dependent variable is one of the five variables: ERC, R_Square, DDAQ, ABVOL, or 
PEAD. The definitions of CDS_FIRM and CDS_TRADE are the same as above. The coefficient 
on the variable CDS_TRADE represents the marginal effect of CDS introduction on the dependent 
variable relative to the effect on non-CDS firms. If the variables increase (decrease) for CDS 
following the onset of CDS trading, relative to changes in non-CDS firms over same time, then β1 
is predicted to be significantly positive (negative).  
We include a set of control variables that are known to influence earnings quality by prior 
research: firm size (LNAT), profitability (ROA), financial leverage (LEV), growth opportunity 
(MTB), and volatility of firm operation (SALESVOL and CFVOL). We also include loss intensity 
(percentage of loss years in the last four years, LOSS%), sales growth (D_Salesgrowth), and firm’s 
size-adjusted stock performance in the measurement year (ABRET) when the dependent variable 
is ERC, R_Square, or DDAQ. This set of controls is consistent with those used by DeFond and 
Park (2001) and Francis et al. (2004, 2005). When the dependent variable is ABVOL, the control 
variables are absolute value of the log of one plus the three-day market-adjusted returns around 
annual earnings announcement (ABSLNRET), log of stock price (LNPRC), log of market value 
(LNMKV), profitability (ROA), financial leverage (LEV), growth opportunity (MTB), and sales 
growth (D_Salesgrowth). These control variables are consistent with Hope et al. (2009). We 
include year and industry fixed effects in all regressions to control for year and industry 
idiosyncratic characteristics. Detailed variable definitions are provided in Appendix.  
The first two columns of Panel A of Table 5 report results of Eq. (3) with ERC and RSQ as 
the dependent variables. Coefficients are estimated using standard errors that are adjusted using a 
two-dimensional cluster at the industry and year level (Peterson 2009). The coefficient on 
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CDS_TRADE is significantly positive for both ERC and RSQ at 0.0643 and 0.0097, respectively 
(with p-values < 0.01 for both regression models). These results support H2, positing that earnings 
relevance increases subsequent to CDS inception.  
[Insert Table 5 near here] 
The third column of Panel A reports results with DDAQ as the dependent variable. DDAQ 
is the standard deviation of the firm-level residuals from the Dechow and Dichev model as 
modified by McNichols (2002) over three years and multiplied by negative one. We drop the 
observations of CDS firms in the CDS initiation year and the next year to avoid the overlap of the 
estimation period of DDAQ between pre– and post–CDS periods. The coefficient on CDS_TRADE 
is significant and positive (with p-value < 0.05). Following the onset of CDS trading, DDAQ 
increases by 4.44%, on average, which is economically significant, given that the mean of DDAQ 
is −0.1087. Because ERC, RSQ, and DDAQ are widely and commonly accepted proxies for 
earnings quality, our results show that CDS initiation is followed by improvement in quality of 
financial reporting, at least from the equity investors’ valuation perspective. 
The last column of Table 5 Panel A reports results with ABVOL as the dependent variable.  
The coefficient on CDS_TRADE is significantly positive (with p-value < 0.05), showing an 
increase in trading volume following the onset of CDS trading. This result, combined with the 
results on RSQ and ERC, are consistent with the idea that investors pay greater attention to earnings 
announcements and use the information contained in earnings in price formation to a larger extent, 
post–CDS inception. 
We next examine PEAD, which is a proxy for investors’ underreaction to value-relevant 
information in earnings. For the PEAD tests, we categorize all firms into tertiles by the signed 
value of SUE by calendar quarters and then retain only the top and bottom tertiles. We report the 
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results in Panels B and C of Table 5. Panel B presents the univariate analysis results, based on the 
firms only in the top and bottom tertiles. Panel B shows that the PEAD phenomenon is significant 
for both CDS and non-CDS firms, on average. Hedges portfolio returns are 0.0093 and 0.0240, 
respectively, both statistically significant. This result indicates that the PEAD phenomenon exists 
in our sample. This measure of PEAD declines from 0.0185 (significant) to −0.0013 (insignificant) 
from pre–CDS years to post–CDS years for the CDS firms. These results support H2 on a 
univariate basis. 
Panel C presents the multivariate results. TopTertileSUE is an indicator that takes a value 
of one if firm-year is categorized in the top tertile of SUE and zero otherwise. Panel C shows that 
the coefficient on TopTertileSUE is significantly positive (with p-value < 0.01), indicating that 
PEAD is statistically and economic significant for our sample CDS and non-CDS firms. However, 
the coefficient on TopTertileSUE × CDS_TRADE is significantly negative (with p-value < 0.01), 
supporting H2, which states that investor attention increases and the underreaction to earnings 
news decreases following the onset of CDS trading.  PEAD for the top SUE tertile for CDS firms 
decreases by 1.68%, on average, subsequent to the CDS trading relative to those for the non-CDS 
firms.  
V. CONTEXTS WITH GREATER H1 AND H2 EFFECTS 
In this section, we examine whether our H1 and H2 findings apply more strongly in certain 
contexts than others. We conduct one test based on whether managers’ improve earnings guidance 
post CD inception. We conduct four tests by partitioning our sample based on borrower and lender 
characteristics to isolate with greater decline in lender interest and monitoring post CD inception: 
borrower default risk, financial covenant intensity, number of lenders, and increase in lender’s 
risk-weighted assets. We conduct another test based on the characteristics of outside shareholders. 
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Borrower Characteristic: Conditional on Earnings Forecasts  
Kim et al. (2017) show that managers respond to shareholder demands for greater 
information, post–CDS inception, by providing more frequent earnings forecasts (Kim et al. 2017). 
Despite the existence of managers’ earnings guidance, shareholders consider financial reports as a 
significant source of relevant information for valuation (Beyer et al. 2010; Holthausen and Watts 
2001). Nevertheless, value relevant information in voluntary earnings guidance could preempt 
information provide by mandatory earnings reports (Kim and Verrecchia 1997; Cheynel and 
Levine 2015). Therefore, we expect a post–CDS demand for improvement in corporate governance 
and financial reporting quality to be higher when managers do not provide, and thus do not 
improve, voluntary earnings guidance.  
We conduct H1 and H2 tests by dividing our sample into two groups—firm-year 
observations with earnings forecasts (EF) and without earnings forecasts (No EF). We then 
separately estimate Eqs. (4) and (5) for those two groups and test the statistical significance of the 
difference of coefficients on CDS_TRADE. As shown in Panel A of Table 6, the coefficient on 
CDS_TRADE is higher for the No EF group than the EF group, when the dependent variable is 
BD_INDEP (with p-values < 0.01), supporting the view that shareholders step up actions to secure 
their interests when more information is not forthcoming from managers on a voluntary basis after 
CDS trading. However, we do not find significant differences between the two groups when the 
dependent variable is Duality.  Panel B of Table 6 shows that the coefficient on CDS_TRADE is 
higher for the No EF group than the EF group, when the dependent variable is ERC, RSQ, and 
ABVOL (with p-values < 0.01). We do not find significant differences between the two groups for 
DDAQ.   
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In H1 and H2 tests, described in Section IV, we find strong support for the idea that 
shareholders take greater interest in firm affairs post–CDS inception, as advanced by Kim et al. 
(2017). Results from four out of our six dependent variables complement Kim et al. (2017) by 
showing an additional yet important instance in which this idea is manifested—attention to 
mandated financial reports and corporate governance, when managers do not improve information 
provision on a voluntary basis.  
[Insert Table 6 near here] 
Lender Monitoring: Increase in Risk-Weighted Assets  
We document a positive correlation between the onset of CDS trading and shareholder 
attentiveness, and our tests assume that lenders hedge their risks post–CDS inception. An ideal test 
would focus only on lenders that buy CDS protection on the reference firm’s credit risk. However, 
identifying CDS traders is empirically challenging because CDS contracts are largely traded over 
the counter and the parties have no obligation to reveal their trades to investors. In this subsection, 
we rely on previous research and strive to identify CDS traders.  
We follow the approach of Martin and Roychowdhury (2015). They illustrate that banks 
likely purchase CDS contracts to hedge their exposure to the underlying borrower’s credit risk when 
the percentage of total risk-weighted assets for a bank that lends to a borrower with CDS contracts 
increases in the same year as the onset of the CDS contracts. We distinguish lending banks by 
extracting data on lending relationships from the Dealscan database, and we manually collect the 
risk weights on banks’ assets from the Federal Reserve’s Y-9C reports. We create the variable 
POS_RISKASSET, which takes a value of one if the lending bank exhibits an increase in the 
percentage of total risk-weighted assets in the same year of CDS initiation, and zero otherwise. 
That bank is likely to have hedged its risk with respect to the focal firm. We then categorize the 
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sample into two groups: one in which lenders likely hedged their risk (More Likely) and another in 
which it is less likely (Less Likely) based on POS_RISKASSET. We then separately estimate our 
multivariate regression models [Eqs. (4)–(5)] for each group.  
Panel A of Table 7 presents the regression results. When the dependent variable is 
BD_INDEP, the coefficient on CDS_TRADE	is positive and significant only for the group in which 
lenders likely hedged their risk (with p-value of difference in coefficients being less than 0.10). 
However, we have insignificant difference when the dependent variable is Duality. 
[Insert Table 7 near here] 
Panel B of Table 7 presents the regression results when the dependent variable is ERC, RSQ, 
DDAQ, or ABVOL. For each variable, the coefficient on CDS_TRADE	is bigger for the subgroup in 
which lenders more likely hedged their risk (More Likely) than for the subgroup in which lenders 
less likely hedged their risk (Less Likely) (with p-value of difference in coefficients being less than 
0.10). This finding are consistent with the proposition that investor interest and earnings relevance and 
usefulness increase to a greater extent when lenders change their behavior after the onset of CDS 
trading.   
Lender Monitoring: Borrower Default risk 
Lead bank suffers reputation costs in loan syndicate markets when inadequate monitoring 
is a contributing factor towards borrower default (Gopalan, Nanda, and Yerramilli 2011). 
However, such reputational fallout is lower when loans are made to riskier clients because it is 
difficult to identify the lead bank’s poor monitoring as the main cause for borrower default. So, to 
the extent that banks lower their monitoring upon obtaining CDS protection, and this lowering is 
moderated by banks’ reputational concerns, that moderation would be lower when loans are made 
to riskier clients. Consistent with this idea, Ashcraft and Santos (2009) find that post–CDS loan 
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spreads increase to a great extent for riskier clients. Kim et al. (2017) find greater post CDS 
inception increase in management forecasts for clients with greater default risk. 
Accordingly, we expect improvement in corporate governance and earnings quality, that is 
associated with reduced lender monitoring following the onset of CDS trading, to be more 
pronounced for riskier borrowers. To test our prediction, we categorize firm-year observations into 
two groups (Low Default Risk and High Default Risk), based on the sample median of modified Z-
score score model (Altman (1968; Campello et al. 2011). We then conduct H1 and H2 tests 
separately in these two subgroups. Table 8 report the results, conditional on the default risk.  
[Insert Table 8 near here] 
Panel A of Table 8, the effect of CDS trading on corporate governance variables, while Panel 
B reports the results of the earnings quality proxies. We find that bigger coefficients on CDS_TRADE 
for the High Default Risk group when the independent variable is BD_INDEP, ERC, and ABVOL.  
The differences between Low Default Risk and High Default Risk are not significant when Duality, 
RSQ, and DDAQ are the independent variables for the coefficients of other three variables. Thus, 
we find partial support for the idea of greater heightening of shareholder interest, associated with 
reduced lender monitoring after the onset of CDS trading, for borrowers closer to debt default. 
Lender Monitoring: Financial Covenants 
Lenders monitor borrower’s operating and investing activities principally through financial 
covenants (Dichev and Skinner 2002, Nini et al. 2009). These covenants serve as automatic 
“tripwires” whose violations affect borrowers’ activities such as investments, net debt issuance, 
line-of-credit availability, and could cause changes in management (Chava and Roberts 2008, 
Roberts and Sufi 2009, Nini et al. 2009, 2012). Therefore, a larger (smaller) number of financial 
covenants implies greater (weaker) effect of lender monitoring on the borrower behavior. All else 
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held equal, thus, any post CDS inception change in borrower behavior, caused by reduced lender 
monitoring, should be more pronounced for firms with fewer financial covenants (Kim et al. 2017).  
To test this prediction, we follow Kim et al. (2017) to categorize the sample into two 
groups, based on the sample median of a firm’s average number of financial covenants across its 
syndicated loans per year: (1) firms with less than or equal to the sample median of financial 
covenants in a loan contract (Fewer Financial Covenants) and (2) firms with greater than the sample 
median of financial covenants (More Financial Covenants). We estimate the number of financial 
covenants as the total number of financial covenants in a loan contract (e.g., Hong, Hung and 
Zhang 2015). All variables are defined in the Appendix. We then reestimate Eqs. (2)–(5) separately 
for these two groups. Table 9 report those results.  
[Insert Table 9 near here] 
Panel A of Table 9 shows that the effect of CDS trading on board independence is stronger 
for the Fewer Financial Covenants group versus the More Financial Covenants group, as indicated 
by a significant difference of coefficients on CDS_TRADE (with p-value < 0.10). Similarly, the 
effect of CDS trading upon CEO duality is negative and significant only for the Fewer Financial 
Covenants subgroup, and the difference between two subgroups is significant (with p-value < 0.01).  
Panel B of Table 9 reports the results of the earnings quality proxies. We find that the positive 
effect of CDS trading upon ERC , RSQ and DDAQ is stronger for the Fewer Financial Covenants 
group, as indicated by a significant difference of coefficients on CDS_TRADE between two 
subgroups (with p-value < 0.05). However, we find insignificant differences with respect to ABVOL. 
For five out of six study variables, the effect of CDS initiation on earnings quality and corporate 
governance is significantly stronger for firms with fewer financial covenants.  
Lender Monitoring: Syndicated Lenders versus Sole Lenders 
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Prior studies indicate that when loan is obtained from a syndicate of lenders than from a 
single lender, free-rider problem in monitoring and information asymmetry and coordination costs 
between lender and borrower are more severe, and contractual flexibility and capacity to 
renegotiate is lower (Preecea and Mullineaux 1996, Ivashina 2009). Amiram et al. (2017) 
document that the lead arranger’s share of the loan and premium demanded by syndicate members 
increases following the onset of CDS trading, indicating that syndicate participants anticipate 
lowering of lead banker’s monitoring post CDS inception. Similarly, Kim et al. (2017) find lower 
demand for management forecasts when lead arranger has higher than the median share of loans, 
that is, when the lead banker has higher economic stake in the loan. Extending this logic, the 
heightening of shareholder should be least pronounced when the lender holds 100% of loans.  
To test this conjecture, we categorize firm-year observations into two groups, Syndicated and 
Solo Lender, by using the data on the lead arrangers of their syndicated loans from DealScan. All 
variables are defined in the Appendix. We then conduct H1 and H2 tests separately for these two 
groups. Table 10 report the results, conditional on the loan syndication.  
[Insert Table 10 near here] 
Panel A of Table 10 shows that the effect of CDS trading on board independence is stronger 
for the Syndicated group versus the Solo Lender group (difference has p-value < 0.10) but the 
difference is not significant for Duality.  Panel B of Table 10 reports the results of the earnings 
quality proxies. We find that the improvements in ERC, RSQ, and DDAQ are stronger for the 
Syndicated group (differences have p-values < 0.05), but not for ABVOL These results are consistent 
with the view that when there are coordination frictions among syndication members, a decline in 
lender monitoring and lender interest in continuation of the borrower occurs to a greater extent 
following the onset of CDS trading than when the loan is obtained from a solo bank. Shareholders 
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step up their information acquisition and strengthen their monitoring to protect their interest, 
depending on whether or not the loan was obtained from a syndicate of banks. 
Shareholder Influence: Dedicated and Focused versus Transient and Diversified  
Institutional Investors  
In this subsection we test whether our results are stronger for firms with the possibility of 
stronger shareholder intervention in corporate affairs post CDS inception. We classify the 
institutional shareholders into transient and dedicated investors based on two portfolio 
characteristics: portfolio turnover and holdings concentration (Bushee 1998, 2001; and Bushee and 
Noe 2000). Investors are classified into the transient subgroup if they have high portfolio turnover 
and highly diversified portfolio holdings. In contrast, dedicated investors have longer investment 
horizons as captured by low portfolio turnover and focused portfolio holdings. We obtain data for 
this classification from Thomson Reuters Institutional Holdings, which are based investment 
firms’13F forms reported to the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) each quarter.  
Using the above data file, we test whether our results are stronger for Dedicated Investors 
or Institutional Investors. Results presented in Table 11 show stronger results for dedicated 
investors when the dependent variable is ERC and ABVOL. However, for other variables, we dnot 
find significant differences between the two groups of investors.  
[Insert Table 11 here] 
V. ROBUSTNESS CHECKS 
Two-Stage Least Squares (2SLS) Specification  
To further address the endogeneity concern related to the onset of CDS trading, we use a 
2SLS specification. In the first stage, we estimate a regression of a binary variable, CDS_TRADE, 
on all control variables of the CDS determinant model specified in Eq. (2) and on two instrumental 
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variables: Industry Peers’ Bond Trading Volume and Investment Grade/Speculative Grade 
Frontier (Kim et al. 2017). These two variables predict the onset of CDS trading but are likely to 
be unrelated to the residuals in the second-stage regression. The first proxies for the degree to which 
lenders hedge in the bond market in the absence of the CDS market. Oehmke and Zawadowski 
(2015) show that credit investors elect the CDS market as the trading venue for their credit hedging 
and for speculative purposes when they experience trading frictions in the underlying bond market. 
Following their study, we measure this variable by the average of the industry peers’ bond trading 
volume (Boehmer, Chava, and Tookes 2015; Kim et al. 2017). Bond trading volume, which provides 
liquidity to investors, is predicted to mitigate trading frictions and reduce investors’ demand for 
hedging and speculation through CDS contracts, thus decreasing the likelihood of the onset of CDS 
contracts. We gather data on the bond trading volume for industry peers from the Trade Reporting 
and Compliance Engine (TRACE) database. We also extract data on the face value of the traded 
bonds at the issue date from the Mergent database. We estimate bond trading volume by dividing 
the dollar volume of a traded bond by its face value. We then measure the average bond trading 
volume of industry peers each year. We standardize this measure by converting it into a decile rank 
(Industry Peers’ Bond Trading Volume).   
Our second instrumental variable, Investment Grade/Speculative Grade Frontier, represents 
the demand for CDS trade. Qiu and Yu (2012) show an inverse U-shaped relationship between CDS 
liquidity and credit rating. Bond investors’ hedging demand is the highest for bonds at the border of 
investment and speculative grades. Bonds with very high credit quality have little hedging demand 
because of their high credit quality, and bonds with below-investment grades have a very steep cost 
of credit protection. We thus create Investment Grade/Speculative Grade Frontier, which is an 
indicator variable that equals one if the credit rating of a firm’s bonds is close to the crossover 
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from investment to speculative grades and zero otherwise; that is, the bonds have an average credit 
rating of BBB–, BBB, or BBB+. We collect corporate long-term bond credit ratings from 
Compustat.   
We present the results of our probit model of board independence in Panel A of Table 12. 
We use CDS_TRADE as the dependent variable and Industry Peers’ Bond Trading Volume and 
Investment Grade/Speculative Grade Frontier as an inverse and a direct proxy, respectively, for 
bond investors’ trading demand. As expected, the coefficients on Industry Peers’ Bond Trading 
Volume and Investment Grade/Speculative Grade Frontier are significantly negative and positive, 
respectively (with p-value < 0.01).  
[Insert Table 12 near here] 
In the second stage, we use the predicted value of CDS_TRADE from the first stage and 
estimate a regression of board independence proxies (BD_IND and Duality) using the fitted value 
of CDS_TRADE. Results for those tests are presented in the last two columns of Table 12, Panel A. 
The coefficient on CDS_TRADE is positive and significant for BD_IND (with p-value < 0.01) and 
is insignificant and positive for Duality. To validate our choice of instrumental variables, we follow 
Larcker and Rusticus (2010) and implement weak instrument identification tests.12 These results 
suggest that the instrument passes the weak instrument tests and that it explains a significant amount 
of the variation in corporate governance structure. 
We also use a 2SLS method to address the endogeneity concern related to the onset of CDS 
trading in our earnings quality analysis. In the first stage, we estimate a regression of a binary 
                                                             
12 The partial F is 1504.74 (p-value < 0.0001), and the under-identification test (chi-squared) is 56.51 (p-value < 
0.0001). These results suggest that the instrument passes the under-identification test and explains a significant amount 
of the variation in CDS trading inception. The weak instrument test yields a Cragg-Donald Wald F of 28.20 that is 
significant at p-value less than 0.05 based on Stock-Yogo critical value table.  
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variable, CDS_TRADE, on all control variables of the CDS determinant model specified in Eq. (2) 
and on two instrumental variables: Industry Peers’ Bond Trading Volume and Investment 
Grade/Speculative Grade Frontier. In the second stage, we use the predicted value of CDS_TRADE 
from the first stage and estimate a regression of earnings quality proxies (ERC, RSQ, DDAQ, and 
ABVOL) using the fitted value of CDS_TRADE. Results for those tests are presented in Panels B–D 
of Table 8. The coefficient on CDS_TRADE is positive for ERC, RSQ, DDAQ, and ABVOL (with p-
value < 0.01). Thus, our main results remain qualitatively unchanged using the 2SLS model, 
indicating that they are less likely contaminated by endogeneity issues. To validate our choice of 
instrumental variables, we follow Larcker and Rusticus (2010) and implement weak instrument 
identification tests.13 These results suggest that the instrument passes the weak instrument tests and 
that it explains a significant amount of the variation in corporate risk-taking behavior. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Most borrowers enter into loan agreements with an understanding that the lender would 
renegotiate the loan terms and would accommodate their needs in the event of adverse economic 
developments. A bank’s interest in accommodating a distressed client’s needs, however, declines 
after the bank purchases a CDS-based insurance on the client’s loan. CDS trades are therefore 
followed by increased lender intransigence and higher frequency of borrower bankruptcy. The 
creation of CDS markets also provides insiders with an avenue to trade on their private information 
about bankruptcy risk without having to reveal those trades to outsiders. The onset of CDS trade 
                                                             
13 For Panel B, the partial F is 1386.03 (p-value < 0.0001), and the under-identification test (chi-squared) is 7,693.69 
(p-value < 0.0001). For Panel C, the partial F is 766.53 (p-value < 0.0001), and the under-identification test (chi-
squared) is 3620.82 (p-value < 0.0001). Finally, for Panel D, the partial F is 368.96 (p-value < 0.0001), and the under-
identification test (chi-squared) is 1750.76 (p-value < 0.0001). These results suggest that the instrument passes the 
under-identification test and explains a significant amount of the variation in CDS trading inception. The weak 
instrument test yields a Cragg-Donald Wald F ranging from 53.87 (p-value < 0.01) for Panel D to 872.88 (p-value < 
0.01) for Panel B, compared with the Stock-Yogo critical value. Stock and Yogo (2005) provide a critical value table 
for a 5% Max IV size 24.09, 10% Max IV size 16.38, and 15% Max IV size 8.96.  
39 
 
thus increases the likelihood of loss of values of external shareholders relative to those of lenders 
and insider shareholders. In this study, we find results consistent with the notion that the outside 
shareholders of a CDS-referenced firm respond to the onset of CDS trading, an event beyond their 
control, by demanding improved corporate governance and financial reporting quality.  
We find an increase in the percentage of independent directors and a decline in the duality 
of the joint CEO–chairman position in the years following the onset of CDS trades. Prior literature 
shows that both of these factors are associated with enhanced protection of outsiders’ rights. We 
also find increases in earnings response coefficient and trading volumes around the earnings 
announcement dates. In addition, the quality of working capital accruals improves and the post–
earnings announcement drift declines. These results indicate that outside shareholders pay greater 
attention to financial reports or demand improvement in the quality of financial reports. Overall, 
our results indicate heightened shareholder interest in firm affairs and a contingent reallocation of 
control rights between managers, lenders, and shareholders post–CDS inception.  
We find that the proxies of earnings quality change in directions consistent with their 
improvement from the equity shareholders’ valuation informativeness perspective, in contrast to 
the prior finding of decline in conservatism, a significant earnings quality proxy from the lenders’ 
perspective. Hence, our study also documents a financial market development that is followed by 
opposite shifts in attributes of financial reporting systems from the shareholders’ and lenders’ 
perspectives.   
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APPENDIX. VARIABLE DEFINITIONS 
 
ABSLNRET = Absolute value of the log of one plus the three-day market-adjusted returns around the 
annual earnings announcement (day −1 to 1). (Source: CRSP) 
ABRET = Firm’s annual size-adjusted returns for fiscal year t. (Source: Compustat North America) 
ABVOL = Firm's actual trading volume for three days around earnings announcement period (day −1 to 1) 
less the mean of trading volume for the 60 days, scaled by the standard deviation of firm's  
trading volume  for the 60 days preceding the annual announcement interval. (Source: CRSP) 
BD_INDEP = Number of independent directors divided by the total number of directors. [Source: 
Institutional Shareholder Services (formerly RiskMetrics)] 
CASHSIZE = Cash and cash equivalent divided by total assets at the end of fiscal year t. (Source: 
Compustat North America) 
CDS_FIRM = Dummy variable that takes a value of one if the firm has traded CDSs anytime during our 
study period and zero otherwise. (Source: Markit) 
CDS_TRADE = Dummy variable that takes a value of one after the inception of CDS trading for CDS 
firms and zero otherwise. (Source: Markit)  
CFVOL = Standard deviation of firm’s operating cash flow over total assets from fiscal year t − 4 to fiscal 
year t. (Source: Compustat North America) 
D_Salesgrowth = Change in net sales in year t divided by net sales in year t − 1. (Source: Compustat 
North America) 
DDAQ = Standard deviation of the firm-level residuals from the Dechow and Dichev (2002) model as 
modified by McNichols (2002) over three years and multiplied by negative one. The model is a 
regression of working capital accruals on lagged, current, and future cash flows plus the change 
in revenue and property, plant, and equipment. All variables are scaled by average total assets. 
The model is estimated cross-sectionally for each industry with at least 20 observations in a given 
year based on the Fama and French (1997) 48 industry classification. We drop CDS initiation 
year’s and next year’s observations. (Source: Compustat North America) 
Duality = Indicator variable that equals one if the company’s CEO is also chairman of the board and zero 
otherwise (Source: Institutional Shareholder Services) 
ERC = Earnings response coefficient. We estimate each firm-year’s ERC by regressing cumulative size-
adjusted three-day stock returns on the quarterly earnings surprise. To estimate firm-year’s ERC, 
we regress cumulative three-day size-adjusted stock returns on the quarterly earnings 
announcement date on quarterly earnings change for each firm year. We measure ERC by the 
coefficient on ΔEarnings. (Source: Compustat North America and CRSP) 
HHI = Herfindahl-Hirschman Index of two-digit Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) industry 
measured at the end of fiscal year t. 
Industry Peers’ Bond Trading Volume = Average annual bond trading volume for a firm’s two-digit SIC 
industry peers. (Source: TRACE) 
Investment Grade/Speculative Grade Frontier = Indicator variable that takes a value of one if a firm’s 
long-term bonds outstanding in a given year have an average credit rating of BBB-, BBB, or 
BBB+ and zero otherwise. (Source: Compustat North America) 
LEV = Total debt (short-term debt plus long-term debt) divided by total assets at the end of fiscal year t. 
(Source: Compustat North America) 
LenderReputation = Derived from the principal component analysis based on two variables: natural 
logarithm of firm market value of equity and long-term Standard & Poor’s (S&P) credit rating. 
Credit rating is defined by an ordinal variable ranging between 1 (AAA) and 19 (CCC-) for firms 
with S&P long-term debt rating. We assign a value of 20 for firms in default stage and 21 for 
firms with no debt rating. 
LNAT = Natural logarithm of total assets at the end of fiscal year t. (Source: Compustat North America) 
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LNFIRMAGE = Natural log of firm i’s age, approximated by the number of years listed on CRSP. 
(Source: CRSP) 
LNMKV = Natural logarithm of firm’s market value at the end of fiscal year t. (Source: Compustat North 
America) 
LNAGE = Natural logarithm of firm’s market value at the end of fiscal year t. (Source: Compustat North 
America) 
LNPRC = Log of price two days before the annual earnings announcement.  (Source: CRSP) 
LOSS% = Loss intensity over the previous four-year period defined as the number of years that a firm has 
negative pre-tax book income from year t - 4 to year t - 1 scaled to range between zero and one. 
(Source: Compustat North America) 
MTB = Market value of equity divided by book value of equity at the end of fiscal year t.  Market value is 
a firm’s market capitalization, calculated as (number of outstanding shares × market price). 
(Source: Compustat North America) 
Non–CDS Firm = A firm that is not CDS Firm. 
PEAD = Difference in the mean POSTRET between the top and bottom tertiles formed by the magnitude 
of SUE. 
POSTRET = Three-month (+2 to +64 trading days following the announcement) buy-and-hold return 
adjusted for contemporaneous buy-and-hold value-weighted market index return. 
RDEXP = Research and development expenditure divided by total assets at the end of fiscal year t. Set to 
zero if missing. (Source: Compustat North America) 
ROA = Net income before extraordinary items divided by total assets at the end of fiscal year t. (Source: 
Compustat North America) 
RSQ = R-squared from firm-year’s ERC regression. We regress cumulative three-day size-adjusted stock 
returns on the quarterly earnings announcement date on quarterly earnings change for each firm-
year. (Source: Compustat North America and CRSP) 
SALEVOL = Standard deviation of firm’s sales over total assets from fiscal year t − 4 to fiscal year t. 
(Source: Compustat North America) 
STRET = Firm’s annual stock return for fiscal year t. (Source: Compustat North America) 
STRETVOL = Standard deviation of a firm’s monthly stock return in fiscal year t. (Source: Compustat 
North America) 
SUE = Actual earnings per share minus last analyst consensus at least three days before the quarterly 
earnings announcement, scaled by stock price at least six but not more than 12 days prior to 
quarterly earnings announcement. 
TOBINQ = Book value of total assets plus market value of equity minus book value of equity divided by 
book value of total assets at the end of fiscal year t. (Source: Compustat North America) 
TopTertile = Indicator variable that takes a value of one if firm-year is for the top tertile of SUE and zero 
otherwise. 
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TABLE 1 
Sample Selection 
 
Panel A: Selection of Samples for Different Tests 
                                                                                                                                                                                                      
Sample                                                                                      
Corporate governance 
Firm-years 
Compustat firm-year observations, 1988–2014 334,866 
Less:  
     Firm-years missing total assets (net sales) and less than $1 million total assets (net 
sales)  
(77,684) 
     Firm-years missing control variables and incomplete observations (106,884) 
     Firm-years missing corporate governance measure (128,891) 
 
Testing board independence (2,722 unique firms) 
 
21,407 
 
ERC/RSQ, DDAQ, and ABVOL 
  
Compustat firm-year observations, 1983–2014 373,788 
Less:  
     Firm-years missing total assets (net sales) and less than $1 million total assets (net 
sales)  
(107,117) 
     Firm-years missing control variables and incomplete observations (132,138) 
     Firm-years missing ERC / RSQ sample  (30,741) 
 
Testing ERC / RSQ (11,682 unique firms) 
 
103,792 
     Firm-years missing DDAQ (38,989) 
 
Testing DDAQ (8,712 unique firms) 
 
64,803 
     Firm-years missing ABVOL (46,294) 
 
Testing ABVOL (2,243 unique firms) 
 
18,509 
 
PEAD 
 Firm-quarters 
Compustat firm-quarter observations, 1983–2014 1,350,084 
Less:  
     Firm-quarters with insufficient data and missing SUE and POSTRET (906,393) 
     Firm-quarters not matched with ERC/RSQ Sample  (32,155) 
     Firm-quarters middle tertiles of SUE (149,079) 
 
Testing PEAD (11,155 unique firms) 
 
262,457 
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Panel B: Yearly Distribution 
 CDS_FIRM NON CDS_FIRM 
Year Frequency Percent Frequency Percent 
1983 26 0.20 235 0.25 
1984 239 1.80 1,672 1.77 
1985 236 1.78 1,740 1.85 
1986 246 1.86 1,831 1.94 
1987 253 1.91 1,852 1.97 
1988 263 1.98 1,880 2.00 
1989 293 2.21 2,129 2.26 
1990 303 2.29 2,257 2.40 
1991 316 2.38 2,368 2.51 
1992 321 2.42 2,427 2.58 
1993 335 2.53 2,593 2.75 
1994 342 2.58 2,715 2.88 
1995 365 2.75 2,890 3.07 
1996 389 2.94 3,054 3.24 
1997 411 3.10 3,268 3.47 
1998 426 3.21 3,269 3.47 
1999 458 3.46 3,626 3.85 
2000 478 3.61 3,601 3.82 
2001 488 3.68 3,388 3.60 
2002 503 3.80 3,531 3.75 
2003 512 3.86 3,451 3.66 
2004 514 3.88 3,359 3.57 
2005 522 3.94 3,700 3.93 
2006 517 3.90 3,612 3.83 
2007 512 3.86 3,544 3.76 
2008 510 3.85 3,444 3.66 
2009 509 3.84 3,470 3.68 
2010 500 3.77 3,328 3.53 
2011 497 3.75 3,247 3.45 
2012 500 3.77 3,189 3.39 
2013 491 3.71 3,183 3.38 
2014 494 3.73 3,170 3.37 
   Total 12,769 100.00 91,023 100.00 
Panel A describes the selection of sample of firms to examine H1 and H2. Panel B presents the yearly 
distribution of the sample for ERC and RSQ tests, the largest sample among all tests. All variables are 
defined in the Appendix.  
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TABLE 2 
Sample Distribution by Industry (Number of Firm-Years) 
 
 CDS_FIRM NON CDS_FIRM 
Industry Frequency Percent Frequency Percent 
Basic industry 2,055 16.09 9,977 10.96 
Capital goods industry 1,250 9.79 13,064 14.35 
Construction industry 413 3.23 1,681 1.85 
Consumer durables industry 1,390 10.89 14,573 16.01 
Food and tobacco industry 601 4.71 2,667 2.93 
Leisure industry 462 3.62 3,782 4.15 
Other industries 198 1.55 3,302 3.63 
Petroleum industry 762 5.97 3,396 3.73 
Real estate and finance industry 1,687 13.21 13,622 14.97 
Services industry 859 6.73 11,554 12.69 
Textiles and trade industry 980 7.67 5,578 6.13 
Transportation industry 324 2.54 2,181 2.40 
Utilities industry 1,788 14.00 5,646 6.20 
   Total 12,769 100.00 91,023 100.00 
 
This table reports the sample distribution across the Campbell (1987) industry classifications for the sample 
used for the ERC and RSQ tests. The sample consists of 103,792 firm-year observations for the period 
between 1983 and 2015. All variables are defined in the Appendix.  
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TABLE 3 
Sample Descriptive Statistics 
 
Variable Mean 25th Percentile 
50th 
Percentile 
75th 
Percentile 
Standard 
Deviation 
CDS_TRADE 0.0596 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.2367 
CDS_FIRM 0.1230 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.3285 
BD_INDEP 0.7282 0.6364 0.7500 0.8571 0.1665 
Duality 0.6381 0.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.4806 
ERC 0.1337 −0.0365 0.0061 0.1361 0.9357 
RSQ 0.3635 0.0735 0.2865 0.6201 0.3125 
ABVOL  1.0224 −0.1646 0.3832 1.4911 1.8249 
DDAQ −0.1087 −0.1081 −0.0516 −0.0260 0.1618 
LNAT 5.9691 4.3724 5.8576 7.4205 2.1397 
ROA −0.0019 −0.0046 0.0320 0.0712 0.1676 
LEV 0.1804 0.0113 0.1290 0.2907 0.1880 
MTB 2.5163 1.0774 1.7216 2.9250 3.2551 
SALESVOL 0.1714 0.0556 0.1176 0.2223 0.1784 
CFVOL 0.0700 0.0244 0.0465 0.0853 0.0771 
LOSS% 0.2491 0.0000 0.2000 0.4000 0.3195 
D_Salesgrowth −0.0286 −0.1465 −0.0116 0.1080 0.4428 
ABRET −0.4964 −6.9588 −1.0945 4.9431 12.3512 
LNPRC 2.4452 1.7707 2.6119 3.2629 1.1297 
POSTRET −0.0008 −0.0138 0.0044 0.0133 0.0658 
SUE 0.0038 −0.0913 0.0116 0.1090 0.2118 
TopTertile 0.5009 0.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.5000 
This table reports descriptive statistics for the sample firms. All variables are defined in the Appendix.  
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TABLE 4 
Changes in Corporate Governance in the Years following the Onset of Credit Default Swap (CDS) 
Trading 
 
Variable BD_INDEP Duality 
CDS_TRADE 0.0350 −0.2968 
 (5.51)*** (−1.98)** 
CDS_FIRM −0.0135 0.3862 
 (−1.34) (2.24)** 
LNAT 0.0094 0.2306 
 (3.15)*** (4.53)*** 
LEV 0.0095 −0.0853 
 (0.42) (−0.47) 
TOBINQ −0.0054 0.0304 
 (−2.60)*** (1.56) 
RDEXP 0.1465 −2.1040 
 (3.09)*** (−4.15)*** 
CASHSIZE 0.0190 0.0180 
 (0.93) (0.10) 
ROA −0.0286 0.2554 
 (−2.14)** (2.32)** 
HHI −0.0448 −0.5759 
 (−0.79) (−1.11) 
LNAGE 0.0218 0.2105 
 (2.33)** (4.05)*** 
STRETVOL 0.0000 0.0185 
 (0.03) (2.66)*** 
   
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes 
Observations 21,407 21,407 
R-squared / pseudo R-squared 0.173 0.087 
 
This table reports the effect of CDS trading upon board independence: BD_INDEP and Duality. All 
variables are defined in the Appendix. The sample consists of 14,708 non-CDS firm-years and 6,699 CDS 
firm-years (1,763 firm-years for pre–CDS initiation and 4,936 firm-years for post–CDS initiation). Year 
and industry fixed effects are included. t-statistics based on robust standard errors clustered by year and 
industry are in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 level, respectively, 
two-tailed in control variables and one-tailed when discussing the results of hypothesis tests with predicted 
signs of coefficient estimates.  
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TABLE 5 
Changes in Financial Reporting Quality in the Years following the Onset of Credit Default Swap (CDS) Trading 
 
Panel A: Earnings Response Coefficient (ERC) and R-Squared (RSQ) 
 
Variable 
ERC 
(1) 
RSQ 
(2) 
DDAQ 
(3) 
ABVOL 
(4) 
CDS_TRADE 0.0643 0.0097 0.0444 0.2649 
 (5.69)*** (2.90)*** (2.24)** (2.46)** 
CDS_FIRM −0.0291 −0.0057 −0.0077 −0.0197 
 (−2.51)** (−2.32)** (−1.57)* (−0.22) 
LNAT −0.0653 −0.0054 0.0047  
 (−6.54)*** (−5.17)*** (5.14)***  
ROA 0.2408 0.0094 −0.0288 0.9465 
 (6.83)*** (1.75)* (−4.38)*** (17.58)*** 
LEV −0.0516 0.0088 0.0144 −0.0140 
 (−2.44)** (1.12) (2.81)*** (−0.13) 
MTB 0.0019 −0.0004 −0.0011 −0.0017 
 (1.32) (−0.99) (−2.16)** (−0.28) 
SALESVOL −0.0644 −0.0047 −0.0246  
 (−1.99)** (−1.40) (−3.94)***  
CFVOL −0.2839 0.0042 −0.3761  
 (−3.70)*** (0.20) (−14.07)***  
LOSS% −0.2367 0.0035 −0.0277  
 (−6.80)*** (0.81) (−3.79)***  
D_Salesgrowth 0.0154 0.0014 −0.0018 0.0632 
 (3.00)*** (0.53) (−0.98) (5.23)*** 
ABRET 0.0005 −0.0001 0.0001  
 (3.24)*** (−1.25) (2.89)***  
ABSLNRET    9.6359 
    (11.69)*** 
LNPRC    0.1459 
    (5.15)*** 
LNMKV    0.0421 
    (2.06)** 
Industry fixed 
effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 103,792 103,792 64,803 18,509 
R-squared 0.025 0.002 0.313 0.243 
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Table 5 Continued.  
 
Panel B: Univariate Analysis—PEAD 
 Full Sample Non–CDS Firms  CDS Firms  
Tertile   All years Pre-CDS Post-CDS 
Top tertile 0.0176 0.0169 0.0260 0.0317 0.0195 
 (31.05)*** (28.17)*** (17.33)** (15.17)** (8.98)** 
Bottom tertile −0.0054 −0.0071 0.0167 0.0132 0.0208 
 (−9.10)*** (−11.83)*** (9.82)*** (5.59)*** (8.55)** 
Difference (top – bottom) 0.0230 0.0240 0.0093 0.0185 −0.0013 
 (28.08)*** (27.74)*** (4.15)*** (5.91)*** (−0.42) 
 
Penal C: Regression Analysis—PEAD 
Dep. Variable= POSTRET 
(1) 
POSTRET 
(2) 
POSTRET 
(3) 
POSTRET 
(4) 
TopTertileSUE 0.0223 0.0222 0.0222 0.0228 
 (9.36)*** (9.37)*** (9.36)*** (13.09)*** 
CDS_FIRM  0.0133 0.0182 0.0182 
  (4.25)*** (4.08)*** (7.40)*** 
CDS_TRADE   −0.0107 −0.0020 
   (−1.94)* (−0.42) 
TopTertileSUE × CDS_TRADE    −0.0168 
    (−4.90)*** 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 262,457 262,457 262,457 262,457 
R-squared 0.041 0.041 0.041 0.041 
This table reports the effect of CDS trading upon earnings quality. The sample consists of 94,203 non-CDS firm-years and 13,252 CDS firm-
years (6,585 firm-years for pre–CDS initiation and 6,667 firm-years for post–CDS initiation). Panel A shows a multivariate analysis on earnings 
quality of pre–CDS initiation and post–CDS initiation and between CDS firms and non-CDS firms. Panels B and C report the effect of CDS 
trading upon post–earnings announcement drift (PEAD). We split the sample into tertiles by SUE and calculate the difference in POSTRET. 
TopTertileSUE is an indicator variable that takes a value of one if firm-quarter is for the top tertile of SUE and zero otherwise.  All other variables 
are defined in The Appendix. Year and industry fixed effects are included. t-statistics based on robust standard errors clustered by year and 
industry are presented in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 level, respectively, two-tailed in control 
variables and one-tailed when discussing the results of hypothesis tests with predicted signs of coefficient estimates. 
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TABLE 6 
Conditioning on Managers’ Earnings Forecast (EF) 
 
Panel A: Board Independence 
Dep. Variable =  BD_INDEP Duality 
 No EF EF No EF EF 
     
CDS_TRADE 0.0545 0.0180 −0.2682 −0.3090 
 (6.22)*** (2.15)** (−1.28) (−1.88)* 
Difference in coefficients  on 
CDS_TRADE for the two 
groups 
−0.0365 −0.0408 
(−3.16)*** (−0.17) 
     
Firm-level controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 11,994 9,413 11,994 9,413 
R-squared / pseudo R-squared 0.188 0.166 0.077 0.087 
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Table 6 Continued.  
 
Panel B: Earnings quality 
Dep. Variable = ERC RSQ DDAQ ABVOL 
 No EF EF No EF EF No EF EF No EF EF 
         
CDS_TRADE 0.0709 0.0220 0.0156 −0.0162 0.0541 0.0468 0.3891 −0.1722 
 (3.86)*** (1.49) (2.68)*** (−2.11)** (1.68)* (1.83)* (4.02)*** (−1.04) 
Difference in 
coefficients  on 
CDS_TRADE for the 
two groups 
−0.0489 −0.0318 −0.0073 −0.5613 
(−2.77)*** (−5.38)*** (−0.26) (3.07)*** 
         
Firm-level controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 64,814 18,091 64,814 18,091 44,349 15,022 15,442 3,067 
R−squared 0.029 0.012 0.002 0.003 0.166 0.344 0.232 0.269 
 
This table reports the effect of CDS trading upon board independence and earnings attributes, after dividing the sample into those do (EF) and do 
not (No EF) provide earnings forecasts. All variables are defined in the Appendix. Year and industry fixed effects are included. t-statistics based 
on robust standard errors clustered by year and industry are in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 level, 
respectively, two-tailed in control variables and one-tailed when discussing the results of hypothesis tests with predicted signs of coefficient 
estimates. 
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TABLE 7 
Lender Identity Analysis 
 
Panel A: Board Independence 
Dep. Variable =  BD_INDEP Duality 
 Hedged Risks 
More Likely 
Hedged Risks 
Less Likely 
Hedged Risks 
More Likely 
Hedged Risks 
Less Likely 
     
CDS_TRADE 0.0258 0.0045 0.0273 0.2330 
 (2.18)** (0.81) (0.13) (0.95) 
Difference in coefficients  on 
CDS_TRADE for the two 
groups 
0.0213 −0.2057 
(1.76)* (−0.82) 
     
Firm-level controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 5,057 5,339 5,057 5,339 
R-squared / pseudo R-squared 0.265 0.275 0.138 0.084 
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Table 7 Continued. 
 
Panel B: Earnings quality 
Dep. Variable = ERC RSQ DDAQ ABVOL 
 
 
Hedged 
Risks More 
Likely 
Hedged 
Risks Less 
Likely 
Hedged 
Risks More 
Likely 
Hedged 
Risks Less 
Likely 
Hedged 
Risks More 
Likely 
Hedged 
Risks Less 
Likely 
Hedged 
Risks More 
Likely 
Hedged 
Risks Less 
Likely 
         
CDS_TRADE 0.0351 0.0195 0.0160 −0.0033 0.0534 0.0260 0.3417 −0.1000 
 (3.13)*** (2.35)** (1.83)* (−0.32) (7.26)*** (1.50)* (1.97)* (−0.61) 
Difference in 
coefficients  on 
CDS_TRADE for the 
two groups 
0.0156 0.0193 0.0274 0.4417 
(1.83)* (1.86)* (1.87)* 
(1.98)** 
         
Firm-level controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 15,097 14,221 15,097 14,221 10,253 9,421 2,660 2,835 
R−squared 0.023 0.054 0.005 0.006 0.198 0.307 0.312 0.215 
 
This table reports the effect of credit default swap (CDS) trading upon board independence and earnings quality. We identify lenders to CDS 
firms and non-CDS firms in our sample using the Dealscan database, and we collect the risk-weighted net assets on banks’ assets from the Federal 
Reserve Y-9C reports. We identify lenders that increased their percentage of total risk-weighted assets in the same year of CDS initiation. We 
infer that those lenders likely hedged their risk to the specific borrower through CDS contracts. We categorize the sample into two subgroups: 
firm-year observations with lenders that increase risk-weighted net assets and those that decrease risk-weighted net assets. All variables are 
defined in the Appendix. Year and industry fixed effects are included. t-statistics based on robust standard errors clustered by year and industry 
are in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 level, respectively, two-tailed in control variables and one-tailed 
when discussing the results of hypothesis tests with predicted signs of coefficient estimates.
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TABLE 8 
Conditioning on default risk 
 
Panel A: Board Independence 
Dep. Variable = BD_INDEP Duality 
Variable Lower Default Risk Higher Default Risk Lower Default Risk Higher Default Risk 
     
CDS_TRADE 0.0259 0.0480 -0.3705 -0.0208 
 (3.45)*** (4.82)*** (-1.83)* (-0.10) 
Difference in coefficients  on 
CDS_TRADE for the two 
groups 
0.0221 0.3497 
(1.96)** (1.58) 
     
Firm Level Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 8,898 8,898 8,898 8,898 
R-squared / pseudo R-
squared 0.178 0.194 0.103 0.072 
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Table 8 Continued. 
Panel B: Earnings quality 
Dep. Variable = ERC RSQ DDAQ ABVOL 
 Lower 
Default Risk 
Higher 
Default Risk 
Lower 
Default Risk 
Higher 
Default Risk 
Lower 
Default Risk 
Higher 
Default Risk 
Lower 
Default Risk 
Higher 
Default Risk 
         
CDS_TRADE 0.0134 0.1086 0.0094 0.0043 0.0469 0.0523 -0.0904 0.3299 
 (1.01) (3.76)*** (1.21) (0.62) (4.45)*** (6.45)*** (-0.78) (3.08)*** 
Difference in 
coefficients  on 
CDS_TRADE for the 
two groups 
0.0952 -0.0051 0.0054 0.4203 
(3.24)*** (-0.54) (0.45) (3.22)*** 
         
Firm-level controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 43,740 43,740 43,740 43,740 29,391 29,390 8,362 8,229 
R−squared 0.011 0.033 0.002 0.005 0.391 0.274 0.141 0.263 
 
This table reports the effect of CDS trading upon board independence and earnings attributes, after dividing the sample based on default risk 
(modified Z-Score), measured by 1.2 × working capital + 1.4 × retained earnings + 3.3 × EBIT + 0.999 × sales / total assets. All other variables 
are defined in the Appendix. Year and industry fixed effects are included. t-statistics based on robust standard errors clustered by year and industry 
are in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 level, respectively, two-tailed in control variables and one-tailed 
when discussing the results of hypothesis tests with predicted signs of coefficient estimates. 
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TABLE 9 
Conditioning on the Covenant Intensity 
 
Panel A: Board Independence 
Dep. Variable = BD_INDEP Duality 
 Fewer Financial 
Covenants 
More Financial 
Covenants 
Fewer Financial 
Covenants 
More Financial 
Covenants 
     
CDS_TRADE 0.0418 0.0275 -0.5057 0.1984 
 (5.22)*** (3.22)*** (-2.19)** (0.75) 
Difference in coefficients  on 
CDS_TRADE for the two 
groups 
0.0143 −0.7041 
(1.76)* (−2.70)*** 
     
Firm Level Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 4,077 2,932 4,077 2,932 
R-squared / pseudo R-
squared 0.232 0.221 0.1311 0.0855 
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Table 9 Continued. 
Panel B: Earnings quality 
Dep. Variable = ERC RSQ DDAQ ABVOL 
 
 
Fewer 
Financial 
Covenants 
More 
Financial 
Covenants 
Fewer 
Financial 
Covenants 
More 
Financial 
Covenants 
Fewer 
Financial 
Covenants 
More 
Financial 
Covenants 
Fewer 
Financial 
Covenants 
More 
Financial 
Covenants 
         
CDS_TRADE 0.0410 0.0228 0.0224 -0.0066 0.0409 0.0230 0.1136 0.2284 
 (3.52)*** (7.98)*** (2.67)*** (-0.39) (4.56)*** (2.90)*** (0.44) (1.54) 
Difference in 
coefficients  on 
CDS_TRADE for the 
two groups 
0.0182 0.029 0.0179 −0.1148 
(2.10)** (2.91)*** (2.01)** (−0.45) 
         
Firm-level controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 11,488 10,543 11,488 10,543 9,530 7,198 1,917 1,753 
R−squared 0.021 0.051 0.007 0.008 0.237 0.416 0.268 0.270 
 
This table reports the effect of CDS trading upon board independence and earnings attributes, after dividing the sample based on the sample 
median of the number of loan financial covenant (Fewer Financial Covenants and More Financial Covenants groups).  The information on the 
total number of financial covenants included in borrower’s loan package is obtained from Deal Scan database. All variables are defined in the 
Appendix. Year and industry fixed effects are included. t-statistics based on robust standard errors clustered by year and industry are in 
parentheses. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 level, respectively, two-tailed in control variables and one-tailed when 
discussing the results of hypothesis tests with predicted signs of coefficient estimates.
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TABLE 10 
Conditioning on Loan Syndication 
 
Panel A: Board Independence 
Dep. Variable = BD_INDEP BD_INDEP Duality Duality 
Variable Syndicated Solo Lender Syndicated Solo Lender 
     
CDS_TRADE 0.0380 0.0232 -0.2872 -1.0481 
 (5.36)*** (1.27) (-1.90)* (-0.71) 
Difference in coefficients  on 
CDS_TRADE for the two groups 
0.0148 0.7609 
(1.97)** (0.72) 
     
Firm Level Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 21,260 147 21,260 138 
R-squared / pseudo R-squared 0.176 0.300 0.087 0.265 
 
Panel B: Earnings quality 
Dep. Variable = ERC RSQ DDAQ ABVOL 
 
Syndicated Solo Lender Syndicated Solo Lender Syndicated Solo Lender Syndicated Solo Lender 
         
CDS_TRADE 0.0645 -0.0258 0.0090 -0.0264 0.0441 0.0097 0.1929 0.1596 
 (5.36)*** (-0.35) (3.18)*** (-1.17) (2.24)** (0.15) (1.77)* (1.18) 
Difference in coefficients  
on CDS_TRADE for the 
two groups 
0.0903 0.0354 −0.0344 −0.0333 
(3.23)*** (2.00)** (−2.14)** (−0.51) 
         
Firm-level controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 100,515 3,277 100,515 3,277 62,274 2,529 17,732 2,893 
R−squared 0.026 0.033 0.002 0.015 0.316 0.260 0.244 0.287 
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This table reports the effect of CDS trading upon board independence and earnings attributes, conditioning on the existence of the syndicated 
loan. The information on the syndicated loan versus sole lender loan is obtained from Deal Scan database. All variables are defined in the 
Appendix. Year and industry fixed effects are included. t-statistics based on robust standard errors clustered by year and industry are in 
parentheses. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 level, respectively, two-tailed in control variables and one-tailed when 
discussing the results of hypothesis tests with predicted signs of coefficient estimates.
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TABLE 11 
Dedicated Institutional Investor Analysis 
 
Panel A: Board Independence 
Dep. Variable =  BD_INDEP Duality 
 Transient 
Institutional 
Investors 
Dedicated 
Institutional 
Investors 
Transient 
Institutional 
Investors 
Dedicated 
Institutional 
Investors 
     
CDS_TRADE 0.0341 0.0438 −0.2615 −0.1892 
 (4.35)*** (4.33)*** (−1.92)* (−1.61) 
Difference in coefficients  on 
CDS_TRADE for the two 
groups 
−0.0097 −0.0723 
(−0.87) (−0.63) 
     
Firm-level controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 10,703 10,704 10,703 10,704 
R-squared / pseudo R-squared 0.185 0.167 0.0671 0.1076 
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Table 11 Continued. 
 
Panel B: Earnings quality 
Dep. Variable = ERC RSQ DDAQ ABVOL 
 
 
Transient 
Institutional 
Investors 
Dedicated 
Institutional 
Investors 
Transient 
Institutional 
Investors 
Dedicated 
Institutional 
Investors 
Transient 
Institutional 
Investors 
Dedicated 
Institutional 
Investors 
Transient 
Institutional 
Investors 
Dedicated 
Institutional 
Investors 
         
CDS_TRADE 0.0178 0.0982 0.0118 0.0075 0.0428 0.0534 −0.2523 0.3089 
 (0.99) (6.51)*** (1.73)* (1.84)* (4.52)*** (5.71)*** (−0.98) (1.97)** 
Difference in 
coefficients  on 
CDS_TRADE for the 
two groups 
0.0804 −0.0043 0.0106 0.5612 
(3.55)*** (−0.62) 1.14 (2.81)*** 
         
Firm-level controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 51,896 51,896 51,896 51,896 32,402 32,401 9,083 9,426 
R−squared 0.024 0.027 0.003 0.003 0.376 0.284 0.083 0.242 
 
This table reports the effect of credit default swap (CDS) trading upon board independence and earnings quality, conditional on the number of 
dedicated institutional investors. We identify lenders to CDS firms and non-CDS firms in our sample using the Dealscan database, and we collect 
the risk-weighted net assets on banks’ assets from the Federal Reserve Y-9C reports. We identify lenders that increased their percentage of total 
risk-weighted assets in the same year of CDS initiation. We infer that those lenders likely hedged their risk to the specific borrower through CDS 
contracts. We categorize the sample into two subgroups: firm-year observations with lenders that increase risk-weighted net assets and those that 
decrease risk-weighted net assets. All variables are defined in the Appendix. Year and industry fixed effects are included. t-statistics based on 
robust standard errors clustered by year and industry are in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 level, 
respectively, two-tailed in control variables and one-tailed when discussing the results of hypothesis tests with predicted signs of coefficient 
estimates. 
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Table 12 
Two-Stage Instrumental Variable Approach 
 
Panel A: Board Independence 
 First Stage Second Stage Second Stage 
Variable CDS_TRADE BD_INDEP Duality 
    
CDS_TRADE  0.4604 0.1230 
  (4.23)*** (0.44) 
Industry Peers’ Bond Trading 
Volume −0.0356   
 (−9.78)***   
Investment Grade/Speculative 
Grade Frontier 0.3482   
 (33.12)***   
CDS_FIRM 0.8232 −0.3108 −0.0563 
 (228.34)*** (−4.08)*** (−0.28) 
LNAT −0.0322 0.0013 0.0444 
 (−17.64)*** (0.58) (7.37)*** 
LEV −0.0583 0.0038 −0.0228 
 (−7.29)*** (0.48) (−1.10) 
TOBINQ −0.0057 −0.0027 0.0062 
 (−4.01)*** (−1.81)* (1.60) 
RDEXP 0.0642 0.1151 −0.5426 
 (1.96)** (3.31)*** (−6.02)*** 
CASHSIZE −0.0067 0.0019 0.0070 
 (−0.68) (0.18) (0.26) 
ROA −0.0309 −0.0199 0.0475 
 (−2.26)** (−1.44) (1.32) 
HHI 0.0531 −0.1034 −0.1609 
 (2.30)** (−3.64)*** (−2.18)** 
LNAGE −0.0199 0.0168 0.0396 
 (−8.43)*** (6.38)*** (5.80)*** 
STRETVOL −0.0004 0.0006 0.0042 
 (−1.30) (1.66)* (4.80)*** 
    
Partial F-statistics F = 1504.74 (p < 0.0001) 
Weak identification test Cragg−Donald Wald F = 28.20 
Stock-Yogo C.V.: 10% Max IV size 16.38 
Stock-Yogo C.V.: 15% Max IV size 8.96 
Under-identification test Chi2 = 56.51 (p < 0.0001) 
Endogeneity test  Chi2 = 21.27  
(p < 0.0001) 
Chi2 = 0.44  
(p = 0.50) 
    
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 20,760 20,760 20,760 
R-squared / pseudo R-squared 0.878 0.133 0.104 
 
 
 
68 
 
Table 12 Continued. 
Panel B: ERC and RSQ as Dependent Variables 
Variable ERC RSQ 
CDS_TRADE 0.7976 0.0709 
 (11.98)*** (3.18)*** 
CDS_FIRM −0.3724 −0.0349 
 (−11.25)*** (−3.15)*** 
LNAT −0.0671 −0.0059 
 (−33.27)*** (−8.76)*** 
ROA 0.2481 0.0101 
 (10.93)*** (1.33) 
LEV −0.0648 0.0079 
 (−3.65)*** (1.33) 
MTB 0.0024 −0.0003 
 (2.55)** (−0.90) 
SALESVOL −0.0730 −0.0062 
 (−3.79)*** (−0.95) 
CFVOL −0.2985 0.0012 
 (−5.94)*** (0.07) 
LOSS% −0.2329 0.0048 
 (−18.57)*** (1.14) 
D_Salesgrowth 0.0152 0.0013 
 (2.29)** (0.60) 
ABRET 0.0005 −0.0001 
 (1.95)* (−1.57) 
   
Partial F-statistics F = 1386.03 (p < 0.0001) 
Weak identification test Cragg-Donald Wald  F =  3843.47 
Stock-Yogo C.V.: 10% Max IV size 16.38 
Stock-Yogo C.V.: 15% Max IV size 8.96 
Under-identification test Chi2 =  7693.69  (p < 0.0001) 
Endogeneity test Chi2 = 131.50 (p < 0.0001) Chi2 = 8.10 (p < 0. 01) 
   
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes 
Observations  103,792 103,792 
R-squared 0.009 0.002 
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Table 12 Continued. 
 
Panel C: Second-Stage Model, with DDAQ as Dependent Variable 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Variable DDAQ 
CDS_TRADE 0.0748 
 (5.50)*** 
CDS_FIRM −0.0276 
 (−4.72)*** 
LNAT 0.0050 
 (14.62)*** 
ROA −0.0314 
 (−8.75)*** 
LEV −0.0025 
 (−0.84) 
MTB −0.0002 
 (−0.99) 
SALESVOL −0.0323 
 (−10.37)*** 
CFVOL −0.3355 
 (−40.33)*** 
LOSS% −0.0129 
 (−6.16)*** 
D_Salesgrowth −0.0030 
 (−2.73)*** 
ABRET 0.0001 
 (3.48)*** 
  
Partial F-statistics F =  766.53  (p < 0.0001) 
Weak identification test Cragg-Donald Wald  F =  1808.19 
Stock-Yogo C.V.: 10% Max IV size 16.38 
Stock-Yogo C.V.: 15% Max IV size 8.96 
Under-identification test Chi2 =  3620.82  (p < 0.0001) 
Endogeneity test Chi2 = 7.12 (p < 0. 01) 
  
Industry fixed effects Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes 
Observations  65,250 
R-squared 0.389 
70 
 
Table 12 Continued. 
 
Panel D: Second-Stage Model, with ABVOL as Dependent Variable 
Variable ABVOL 
  
CDS_TRADE 0.9564 
 (3.54)*** 
CDS_FIRM −0.3041 
 (−2.54)** 
ABSLNRET 9.6385 
 (60.93)*** 
LNPRC 0.1526 
 (8.17)*** 
LNMKV 0.0381 
 (3.62)*** 
ROA 0.9292 
 (10.51)*** 
LEV −0.0468 
 (−0.64) 
MTB −0.0017 
 (−0.40) 
D_Salesgrowth 0.0643 
 (2.22)** 
  
Partial F-statistics F = 368.96 (p < 0.0001) 
Weak identification test Cragg-Donald Wald F = 872.88 
Stock-Yogo C.V.: 10% Max IV size 16.38 
Stock-Yogo C.V.: 15% Max IV size 8.96 
Under-identification test Chi2 = 1750.76 (p < 0.0001) 
Endogeneity test Chi2 = 7.19 (p < 0.01) 
  
Industry fixed effects Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes 
Observations 18,509 
R-squared 0.240 
  
 
This table reports results on the effect of credit default swap (CDS) inception upon board independence and 
earnings quality using a two-stage least squares approach. Panel A reports results of the first stage with 
dependent variable CDS_TRADE and the second stage with dependent variables BD_INDEP and Duality. 
Panel B reports results of the second-stage model with dependent variables ERC and RSQ; Panel C, DDAQ; 
and Panel D, ABVOL. All variables are defined in the Appendix. t-statistics in parentheses are based on 
robust standard errors clustered by industry and year. ***, **, and * represent significance at the 1%, 5%, 
and 10% level, respectively. 
 
